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ABSTRACT
International law, as a discipline, is obsessed with crises, requiring reinterpretation of its basic principles to
cope with them. Through this process of reinterpretation, it also creates new rules. Terrorism is one such ‗crisis‘
which has impacted the international legal framework on the use of force, making it deviate from its basis
established by the United Nations Charter. This thesis conducts a macro analysis of the changes in the legal
framework for combating terrorism after 9/11 and the Arab Spring. It focuses on the Syrian conflict as a case
study, analyzing the major actors and their different legal justifications. The Syrian conflict is a clear prototype
of the changes that started to take place after 9/11. The development in the legal framework governing the use
of force happened in three dimensions. The first is the broadening of existing rules (such as favoring a purposeoriented interpretation of self-defense to include new forms such as anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defense).
The second dimension is the creation of new rules through state practice that replaced existing codified ones, in
an attempt to avoid the deadlock of the Security Council (SC) veto. For example, the ―unwilling and unable‖
standard is used to justify unilateral interventions without the SC authorization to fight terrorists in other states.
A third dimension is the gradual decline of the use of collective security under the UN system, 1 giving way to
unilateral action by States.

1

It refers to the United Nations‘ role to ―provide an institutional framework for the collective maintenance of peace and
security as well as to ―outlaw the unilateral use of force‖. Simon Chesterma, Michael Byers, Has US power destroyed the
UN? LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, Para 2, (1999).
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I. Introduction
“The world had never been witness to such collective phobia of the terrorist others as
today.”2 Foucault
Terrorism is a heavily repeated term in today‘s world. Although terrorism itself is an
ambiguous term, whose definition under international law lacks consensus, there is a general
consensus that it entails the perception of terror and fear. Therefore, terrorists have been
designated internationally as enemies of humanity (hostis humani generis).3
Since the Second World War, terrorism has been used by states either as a pretext for
intervention (on behalf of the government, or without its consent) or as a proxy war strategy.4
For example, the Afghani communist government invited the USSR to combat AlMujahedeen in Afghanistan.5 By and large, however, terrorism was confronted under what is
known as the ‗criminal justice model‘. The international response to 9/11 went far beyond
limited action, affecting the entire legal framework for combating terrorism.6 It changed the
criminal justice model of combating terrorism, which deals with terrorism as a crime, to a
military one, which deals with it as a crisis that can only be tackled militarily. 7 It depends on
the perception that terrorism should be prevented through other means because prosecution is
not effective enough.8
This thesis considers how two terrorist ‗crises‘, one international (namely the 9/11 attacks)
and the other regional (namely the Arab Spring) have affected the international legal
framework on combating terrorism. The significance of ‗crises‘ lies in their creation of new
rules of international law and the amendment of existing ones.

2

J.Tripathy, What is a terrorist? 13 Int. J. Cult. Stud, 221 (2010).
See, Elimma C. Ezeani, The 21st Century Terrorist: HostisHumani Generis?03 BEIJING LAW REVIEW 158–169 (2012).
4
Ben Saul, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oxford UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2 (2006).
5
Ibid.
6
Christine Gray, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 195 (2008).
7
C. J. Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 20 EJIL, 373 (2009).See, Frederic Megret, War? Legal Semantics and The
Move to Violence, EJIL, (2002).
8
Victor V. Ramraj, et. al, GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSPRESS, 573
(2012).
3

The consequences of ‗crises‘ can also extend beyond this to include acting outside the law
altogether. Sima argued that when changes reach the extent of acting outside the law, the
inevitability of action due to moral considerations is the most commonly used justification:
"unfortunately there do occur ‗hard cases‘ in which terrible dilemmas must be faced and
imperative political and moral considerations may appear to leave no choice but to act
outside the law.‖

9

The 9/11 ‗crisis‘ is a turning point in the evolution of combating terrorism, triggering
changes to the existing model for combating terrorism from two perspectives: horizontally in
the relations between states and vertically in the relation between states and individuals.10 In
fact, the 9/11 attacks were not the first crisis to affect the structure of international law
related to the use of force. For example, the Second World War triggered the establishment
of the United Nations that introduced a multilateral use of force authorized by the Security
Council in specific cases. The Kosovo ‗crisis‘ laid the basis for the possibility of
humanitarian intervention outside UN authorization in the case of grave human rights
violations.11
Changes to the structure of international law usually coincide with political rhetoric that
paves the way for justifiable change. The crisis puts states in a situation whereby they have to
do ‗something‘ to halt it or mitigate its consequences. However, this ―something‖ gives
discursive power to states to decide what the action is, with no further explanation of why
this is the optimal solution. A case in point is when NATO bombed Yugoslavia to end the
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1999. The former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair urged
action by the international community, stating: ―the world must do something or do
nothing‖.12

9

Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: a Discipline of Crisis, The Modern Law Review, 387 (2002).
Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the „War Against Terrorism‟, International Affairs, 301 (2002).
11
The Kosovo case triggered the questions of balance between ―moral imperative‖ and legality. This case paved the way for
many claims of an establishment of lawful grounds of humanitarian intervention if there are grave human rights violations.
See, Hilary Charlesworth, supra note 9.
12
Ibid.
10
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9/11 is not the first terrorist incident by al Qaida against US interests or on US territory.13
Moreover, Europe had witnessed terrorist attacks and more deaths a result of terrorism in the
1970s and 1980s than the causalities resulting from the 9/11 attack.14 Although the
international community had experienced terrorism before 9/11, however, this ‗crisis‘
triggered increased calls for the prevention of terrorism internationally. The intensity of this
concern of terrorism emerged as a result of the complexity in finding a suitable and effective
response to it.15 The events of 9/11 therefore worked as a catalyst for restructuring
international law through introducing terrorism as a new form of threat to international peace
and security,16 triggering the US and international intervention in Afghanistan.17 Had these
attacks not happened, this development would either not have occurred or at least, it would
have happened in a ‗fitful‘ and ‗piecemeal‘ manner.18
This paper argues that the legal framework of combating terrorism has changed since 9/11
and that this change has been fostered, at the regional level, after the Arab Spring. The crisis
of 9/11, which consolidated the military model of combating terrorism, led to their
interpretation of the requirements of self-defense (especially imminence) to include new
forms such as anticipatory and preemptive self-defense. In addition, the rules of attribution
under the law of state responsibility have evolved to include the laxer standard of ‗harboring
terrorism‘ as well as the ‗unwilling or unable standard‘.
Furthermore, this thesis argues that the change triggered by 9/11 established the foundation
for further change, at the regional level, in response to the Arab Spring, transforming the
legal framework for combating terrorism in the Arab region.

13

Christine Gray, supra note 6 at 194.
The Threat Is Already Inside | Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/20/the-threat-is-already-insideuncomfortable-truths-terrorismisis/?utm_content=buffer60819&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer (last visited Nov
27, 2015).
15
Victor V. Ramraj, et. al, supra note 8 at 1.
16
Mary Buckley, Robert Singh, THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM: GLOBAL REACTIONS,
GLOBAL CONSEQUNCES, ROUTLEDGE, 14 (2006).
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
14
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National ‗Wars on Terror‘ have emerged on the scene as regional responses to terrorism in
Arab states. This paper focuses specifically on Syria as a case study. The uniqueness of the
Syrian crisis is not only that it still faces a prolonged civil war, but that it embodies the whole
evolution of international law and collective security in one setting. In addition, the national
War on Terror led by Bashar Al Assad‘s regime has been extended to benefit other regional
and international actors.19
In addition, the paper argues that the 9/11 ‗crisis‘ triggered two contradictory developments
in collective security in terms of the role played by the UN: first, expanding the role of the
Security Council (SC) to include legislative and administrative authorities; and second,
marginalizing the UN‘s role at the expense of unilateral action by states, where SC
authorization of individual or collective security takes place.
Part one of this thesis deals with the development of the international law framework
prohibiting terrorism. First, it analyzes the pre-9/11 legal framework and the challenges
precluding the agreement on an international definition of terrorism within the UN. Second,
it discusses the development of so-called ‗sectoral treaties‘ that recognize certain acts as
terrorism. Third, it analyzes the criminal justice model for combating terrorism, based on the
‗prosecute or extradite‘ system, as the main system that addressed terrorism before 9/11.
Part two analyzes the military mode of combating terrorism introduced after the 9/11
‗crisis‘. It begins with a brief overview of the international legal framework governing the
use of force before 9/11. Then, it analyzes the development of this system after 9/11 through
analyzing the shift in the scope and implementation of the right to self-defense and the law of
state responsibility. It argues that the declared post-9/11 ‗War on Terror‘ favors a more
lenient interpretation of the right to self-defense, while broadening the principles of
attribution under the law of state responsibility to include ‗harboring terrorism‘ and the
‗unwilling or unable‘ standard.

19

For example, after the incident of burning of the Jordanian Pilot Maaz el Kasasbah by ISIS troops, Jordan used airstrikes
against the Syrian territory without seeking the consent of the Syrian regime. Although Jordan violated the sovereignty of
Syria, their airstrikes were met with no condemnation from the international community. This international acquiescence is
based on the fact that ISIS is a terrorist group and that Jordan can therefore benefit from the declared war on terror in Syria.
Another example for international actors is the US led coalition and Russia's airstrikes in Syria.

4

Part three analyzes the simultaneous change in the collective security system under the UN
framework. It argues that the UN Charter‘s collective security system has been restructured
after the adoption of Security Council Resolution (1373) of 2001, recognizing terrorism as a
threat to international peace and security.20 It analyzes the authority of the SC to determine
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, in light of 9/11. It also tackles
the evolving role of the SC after 9/11 which experienced two phases: the first involved a rise
in collective security through expanding the SC‘s functions to include being legislator and
quasi administrator; and the second phase involved the marginalizing of collective security
altogether and favoring unilateral actions by states.

Part four addresses the influence of the Arab Spring on the legal framework for combating
terrorism, through a case study on Syria‘s national ―War on Terror‖ and its legal
implications. The Arab Spring is analyzed as another ‗crisis‘, constituting a landmark
incident in the contemporary legal framework for combating terrorism. This chapter draws a
link between the international ―War on Terror‖ declared by the US after 9/11 and the
nationalized ones declared after the Arab Spring. It argues that this nationalized War on
Terror has been appropriated to the Syrian regime and other international actors, including
the US-led coalition, Russia, and France. It emphasizes this understanding through analyzing
the perspectives of the major actors involved in the War on Terror, namely the Syrian
regime, the US-led Coalition, Russia and the UN Security Council. The main argument is
that fighting terrorism is a shared base, which all of the recent actors in the conflict–in spite
of their differences– used to justify the legality of their actions.

20

Ben Smith, Arabella Thorp, The legal basis for the invasion of Afghanistan, LONDON: HOUSE OF (2010),
http://194.109.159.7/ukparliament/20100423142209/http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia05340.pdf (last visited Nov 22, 2015).

5

II. The Development of the International Law‟s Framework
Prohibiting Terrorism After 9/11
For the purpose of analyzing how the international legal framework for combating terrorism
has changed since 9/11, it is important to begin with the evolution of efforts to combat
international terrorism. This evolution is reflected in two models, namely the criminal justice
model and the military model.
This chapter begins with analyzing the challenges facing having a universally agreed upon
definition of terrorism as well as a discussion of the international attempts to define
terrorism. Finally, the chapter discusses the criminal justice model of confronting terrorism
that is a model refers to terrorism as a crime; whoever commits this crime should be
prosecuted or extradited. It aims at law enforcement through incorporating provisions of
criminal codes related to terrorism, which requires an agreed upon definition of the crime for
legal purposes.
A. Definition of Terrorism

The definition of terrorism has a long history and continues to defy agreement. The term
―terror‖ was introduced in the West's political dictionary through the French revolutionaries
describing the actions against their domestic enemies in 1793 and 1794.21 This revolutionary
perception of terrorism was short-lived. It was replaced in 1930 by a new perception
entailing terrorism representing oppression by authoritarian regimes against their people.22
For example, Japan used the bombings in Burma during World War II in order to ―spread
panic and alarm among the civilian population.‖23 With time, the notion of terrorism was
stretched to include ―non-state practices‖.24

21

Charels, Tilly, Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists, Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium
(Mar., 2004), American Sociological Association, 5-13 (2015).
22
Ben Saul, supra note 4 at 278.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid at 2.
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For example the Russian revolutionaries in the late nineteenth century were generally
designated as ―terrorists‖.25 On the international level, the term became widely used starting
with the Lockerbie incident.26 This was the first incident that signaled that terrorism was no
longer a national issue because; it displayed the international potentials of the crime.27
The introduction of the term ‗terrorism‘ in international law has been a debated topic among
scholars. There are those who believe that terrorism should not be a separate crime such as
Tripathy. In contrast, others such as James A. Green and Tom Ruys believe that it is
necessary to distinguish terrorism from other crimes that resemble it. However, there is little
literature concerning the necessity of treating terrorism as a separate crime. Tripathy argues
that there is no need for including terrorism as a new crime for two reasons. First, most of the
acts that –in contemporary international law-are usually described as terrorism are already
criminalized under national criminal codes such as murder and abduction, if they occur in
peace time.28 For example, the 9/11 attacks including ―hijacking of the four aircraft and the
subsequent killing of those on board and those who died in the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon all are crimes under US criminal law.‖29

25

Ben Saul, supra note 4 at 2.
In 1988, a Pan Am flight was destroyed by a bomb while flowing over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two armed Libyan
intelligence services officers were charged with ―the commission of terrorism‖, International Court of Justice,
http://www.icj cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=460&code=lus&p1=3&p2=3&case=89&k=82&p3=5 (last visited Nov 23,
2015). See, Robert Black, THE LOCKERBIE CASE: FROM THE BEGINNING WE HAVE ALL SOUGHT JUSTICE AND TRUTH THE
LOCKERBIE CASE (2015), http://lockerbiecase.blogspot.com.eg/2015/11/from-beginning-we-have-all-sought.html (last
visited Nov 23, 2015). See also Robert Black, THE LOCKERBIE CASE: LOCKERBIE PROSECUTION LEAVES A ―GAPING HOLE‖ THE
LOCKERBIE CASE (2015), http://lockerbiecase.blogspot.com.eg/2015/11/lockerbie-prosecution-leaves-gaping-hole.html (last
visited Nov 23, 2015).See, Rosalyn Higgins, Mourice Flory, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 20 (1997),
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=170071 (last visited Nov 23, 2015).
27
In 1992, the Security Council Resolution 731, concerning the Lockerbie case considered attacking civil aviation to be an
act of terrorism. According to the resolution, the Security Council ―Deeply concerned by all illegal activities directed
against international civil aviation, and affirming the right of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and relevant principles of international law, to protect their nationals from acts of international terrorism that constitute
threats to international peace and security‖ UNSC Resolution 731 (1992), Para 2 available at ,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/731(1992) (last visited Nov 23, 2015).See, YONAH
ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: POLITICAL AND LEGAL DOCUMENTS (1992).
28
J. Tripathy, Supra note 2, at 222.
29
Christopher Greenwood, supra note 10 at 302.
26
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Furthermore, most of these actions are also prohibited under International Humanitarian Law
(IHL) that applies to both regular armed forces and non-state actors, if they occur during
armed conflicts either of an international or non-international character.30
The second reason Tripathy gives for justifying why terrorism should not be a separate crime
is that criminal law generally attempts to avoid any term that generates emotion in order to
prevent the accuser‘s prejudice.31 For Tripathy, terrorism is an empty notion and functionally
unnecessary as it gives states discursive power for defining for themselves who they consider
terrorists to be.32 This power allows those who wield it to draw a fine line between who
stands outside the law and who stands inside the law.33 To illustrate, this discursive power
sets the standards distinguishing between terrorists and ―freedom fighters‖ based on interests.
For example the U.S. recognized the Taliban as ―freedom fighters‖ during their resistance to
Russian forces, and then the US described them as terrorists when the Taliban emerged
against the US.34
On the other hand, for those who believe that terrorism should be a separate crime, they
argue that such introduction is compatible with the emerging powers and dangers of nonstate actors.35 However, they disagreed over having a generally accepted definition.

30

Challenges for IHL - terrorism: overview - ICRC, Para 1, https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/contemporary-challengesfor-ihl/terrorism/overview-terrorism.htm (last visited Nov 23, 2015).
31
Ben Saul, supra note 4 at 4.
32
J.Tripathy, Supra note 2, at 222.
33
Ibid at 223.
34
Ibid at 223.In addition, terrorism based on this understanding is merely ―an emotionally charged morally laden and
political continuous concept, which has nevertheless emerged as a critical and unavoidable feature of the legal landscape,
both internationally and domestically.‖ Victor V. Ramraj, et. al, supra note 8 at 5.
35
The debate over defining terrorism emerged after the end of the Cold War, especially with the emergence of terrorist acts
by non-state actors. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, Para 38, available at,
https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/h/hoffman-terrorism.html (last visited Dec 20, 2015).Non-State actors ―is a category
comprising of individuals or groups that are not part, or acting on behalf, of a State.‖ James A. Green, Tom Ruys, “Armed
Attack” and Article 51 of the UN Charter, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW,7 (2011). This heated debate
coincided with several changes on the international sphere that included ―the upsurge in terrorist incidents directed against
the United States, fears associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR), the possibility that nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons were no longer under strict control, and the appearance of Osama Bin Laden and his transnational
network.‖ Boulden, Jane, and Weiss, Thomas George, eds. Terrorism and the UN : Before and After September 11, Wither
Terrorism and The United Nations?, Indiana University Press, 6, (2004). (ProQuest ebrary Web. 23 May 2015).
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For those who believe that there should not be a separate crime, they argue that it is
preferable to deal with terrorism in a pragmatic way through agreeing upon ―norms‖.36 This
point of view attempts to avoid the controversy of reaching an agreed upon definition
through suggesting another pragmatic alternative that is ―norms‖. However, this suggestion
would not solve the problem of reaching an agreed upon definition. It only shifts it to another
sphere that is ―norms‖, taking into account the perception of the gap of norms between first
and third world states.37 For those who believe that there should be an agreed upon
definition, they claim it is necessary for the international criminalization of terrorism which
firstly, reflects the international community‘s desire to deal with terrorism beyond the
borders of the national criminal codes.38 This opinion claims those national criminal codes‘
differences of defining terrorism halt tackling terrorism. Therefore, there should be a
universally agreed upon definition for better combating the phenomenon. The second reason
is that lacking a comprehensive definition violates the principle of legality, which requires
that a perpetrator not to be prosecuted for a crime unless it is clearly defined under the laws
before the crime is committed.
To conclude, although having an agreed upon definition cannot avoid all the abuses of the
term,39 it does at least limit them. For example, ―terrorism‖ was used in Northern Ireland in
1990 in order to ―placate the electorate‖ rather than achieving law enforcement purposes.40 In
addition, a definition can be useful in controlling to whom the use of force is directed and by
whom? This clarifies the legal consequences of such usage.41

36

Rosalyn Higgins, Mourice Flory, supra note 26 at 14.
Ibid.
38
Here is a point outside the research questions, which is who is this international community; according to Kennedy and I
agree with him it is ― ‗a fantasy‘ of objective agreement , when it is really the product of a small bureaucratic technical
class‖ which Abi-saab, affirmed that ―Rather than referring to a group as a community in general, it is better, for the sake of
precision , to speak of the degree of community existing within the group in relation to a given subject , at a given moment‖
See, Ben Saul, supra note 4 at 11.
39
A case in point, if there is no evidence of the intent of the crime of ‗genocide‘ it ―erodes its descriptive utility.‖ See,
Ibid at 22.
40
Ibid at 25.
41
Rosalyn Higgins, Mourice Flory, supra note 26 at 14.
37
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It can serve in limiting the use of force by governments against their political opposition and
protecting the application of human rights as well as states‘ manipulation to intervene in
other states under the umbrella of terrorism.42
B. International Attempts to Define Terrorism

There have been many attempts by international organizations to reach an agreed definition
of terrorism.43 The various attempts to define terrorism starting with the attempts by the
League of Nations in 1937,44 to the UN General Assembly‘s attempts in 1994,45 have failed
to reach an agreed definition of terrorism. The first international attempt to legally approach
the phenomenon of international terrorism through international organizations started during
the era of the League of Nations on the occasion of the assassination of the King Alexander I
of Yugoslavia in France by a Croatian separatist.46 Following this, the League on Nations
called upon states to criminalize terrorism in the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Terrorism.47 The next step to define terrorism was made by the International
Law Commission (ILC) in its 1954 Draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security of
Mankind. In this code terrorism was associated with aggression.48 There was no concept of
terrorism outside of armed conflict and ―terrorists‖ were those who acted on behalf of a state
but not acts by non-state actors.49

42

Ben Saul, supra note 4 at 12.
Bruce Hoffman, supra note 35 at Para 38.
44
It defined terrorism as ―all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons or a groups of persons or the general public.‖, Carlyle A. Thayer, ―Political Terrorism and
Militant Islam in Southeast Asia‖ (2003), Rommel C. Banlaoi, Counter-Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How
Effective Are They? (Manila:Yuchengco Center, 2009)], Available at
http://declassifiedrommelbanlaoi.blogspot.com/2011/01/defining-terrorism-conceptual problems.html (26th May 2015).
45
It defined terrorism as “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of
persons or particular persons for political purposes.” General Assembly Res 49/60, Para 3(1994), available at,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm.
46
Ben Saul, supra note 4 at 171.
47
This treaty sought to define terrorism as ―all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a
state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.‖ It is important to note that the
problem of tackling terrorism as a crime in this convention was not mainly reaching a definition beyond, but rather the
extradition of criminals. Ibid at 173, 176, See, League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism - Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-the-law/league-nations-convention-preventionpunishment-terrorism/p24778 (last visited Nov 22, 2015).
48
Ben Saul, supra note 4 at 180.
49
Ibid at 176.
43
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There are other efforts by the General Assembly to tackle terrorism. Since the 1970s, the
General assembly has contended that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security
and to friendly relations.50 The year 1972 was a determining point in the timeline of these
efforts, starting with the language used by the GA. For example, the term "increasing acts of
violence" has been replaced with the term "terrorism", the phrase "deep concern" has been
replaced with condemnation, and general recommendations have been replaced with specific
ones.51 In addition, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism in
response to the emerging threat of terrorist incidents, specially the massacre of Israeli athletes
at the 1972 Munich Olympics.52 The General Assembly in its 1985 Resolution 40/61
"unequivocally condemn[ed], as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism
wherever and by whomever committed,"53 by referring to the specific criminal acts in the
sectoral conventions.54 These specific conventions consider the actions that fall under them
as terrorist acts irrespective of their motivations.
There are eleven United Nations‘ multilateral conventions that have been widely ratified
condemning terrorist actions. The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,55 and the International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages are examples.56 Later emerges the role played by the Ad Hoc
Committee, which was established by the General Assembly in 1996 in the drafting of
several international conventions.57
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Ibid at 539.
54
However, GA Res 49/60 in 1994 signals a consensus on the prohibition of acts of terrorism ‗irrespective of their
motivation‘, Andrea Bianchi, Yasmin Naqvi, Terrorism in The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, ,
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25/5/2015).
57
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Although these sectoral conventions criminalize certain and limited actions irrespective of
any justification as terrorist acts,58 they are ratified by a limited number of states. 59 In
addition, they only apply when the act has an international dimension. For example, the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in 1997 and the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 1999 do not
apply if the acts are committed in one state and the terrorist is from the same state and no
other state has jurisdiction over it.60 However, both the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and the Protocol on Continental Platforms are the only treaties
that apply to acts committed within the territory of a state by a national of the same state. 61
This does not mean that the act should be committed in more than one state in order to fulfill
the international dimension, but rather there are other determining factors. These factors
include the effect and gravity of acts. If an act happens in one state and affects international
peace and security like crimes against humanity, it includes an international dimension.62
Furthermore, these types of crimes included in sectoral treaties ‗can‘ constitute terrorism by
taking into consideration other determining factors and circumstances.63 It is not sufficient to
consider an act resembles those in the sectoral treaties as a terrorist action unless it includes
an international dimension.
The problem of lacking a definition is a political rather than a legal /technical one.64 This
dilemma is based on the inability of the Western and Third World states to reach a
compromise. This gap concerns what constitutes terrorism,65 especially the status of
liberation movements.
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The concern of the Western states has been the fear of the inclusion of ‗state terrorism‘, 66 as
well as all acts of terrorism being criminalized regardless of their motives with no exception.
To illustrate, the US Army Command,67 the US Department of Defense,68 UK Terrorism Act
(2000),69 and UN SC Resolution 1566 (2004)70 condemn terrorism in all its forms and
regardless of its motives, which implies that acts that serve political, religious or ideological
aims can equally be considered terrorist acts. In contrast, the Council of the League of Arab
States71 considers national liberation movements worthy of exclusion because their practices
are an exercise of ―the legitimate right of peoples to struggle against occupation,‖ 72 such as
the Israeli occupation of Palestine.73 This missing compromise is based on the lack of clear
criteria of the elements of terrorism.74 Furthermore, the subjectivity in the understanding or
the implementation of the term hinders having a universal definition. For example, the US
considers that a terrorist incident is not only what jeopardizes American citizens or American
Service personnel, but also American interests, which is different than other states‘
interests.75
A considerable body of scholarly work, supported by Ben Saul, David N. Gibbs, and J.
Tripathy justifies the problem of the lack of a criterion of the ―terrorist‘ by basing it on the
power of hegemony ―to demonize the other‖.76
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The significance of this hegemony over concepts is that it paves manipulations that are based
on these created concepts for the interest of whom craved them.77 This is highlighted by
Kimberly Trapp‘s observation that shows how a lack of a definition leads to confusion
allowing ―opportunistic appropriation‖78:
[a]ccepting in principle that support for lawful acts of war should not be criminalized as
acts of terrorism when those acts are carried out against our enemies, but prosecuting
support for such acts when they are carried out against our own troops is the height of
hypocrisy..79
Finally, although the criminal justice model is justified legally to track a crime, its success on
the ground is not justifying reaching an agreed upon definition.80 Regardless of the problem
of definition, it is now clear that this term has legal consequences that, when used, take
advantage of the perception of the ‗public panic‘ that the term itself lends.81
C. The Criminal Justice Model of Confronting Terrorism
A criminal justice model generally is concerned with denouncing crimes. Under the criminal
justice model of confronting terrorism, states are required to prosecute terrorists on their
territory or extradite them to other states to face prosecution (aut dedere aut judicare). This
model was generally the most recognized and followed model for combating terrorism for a
long time,82 while the military model, which includes extraterritorial use of force, remains
exceptional.83
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This obligation to prosecute or extradite has been included in all sectoral conventions against
international terrorism since 1970.84 This model seeks to criminalize terrorist actions and
foster cooperation among states in their fight against terrorism,85 which has been of interest
to international organizations starting with the League of Nations. This part tackles the
principle of aut dedere aut judicare, the problem of the political offence exception, and the
evolution of the principle through case studies of Lockerbie and Bin Laden cases,
respectively.

1. The Principle of aut dedere aut judicare
This principle is the modern version of aut dedere aut punier introduced by Grotius in
1625,86 which provides that whenever a perpetrator commits a crime and flees to another
state; this state has a duty either to extradite or to punish him.87 Aut dedere aut judicare refers
to an obligation of states to either prosecute domestically or extradite to another state
perpetrators of international crimes.88 It aims at tracing criminals to apply justice and fight
immunity where perpetrators escape criminal responsibility.
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Furthermore, it aims at securing cooperation for the suppression of terrorism. This obligation
should be distinguished from the universal jurisdiction that introduces the legal basis for
prosecution without reference to further obligations such or prosecution or extradition.89 It is
not sufficient for an act to be considered terrorist in order to fit with the scope of the
principle, but also must include an international dimension constituting a violation of
international law.90 This obligation was highlighted in the 1970 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.91 Following this, the principle of prosecute or
extradite has been included in almost all sectoral conventions against international
terrorism92 as well as several SC resolutions such as resolutions 1373 (2001),93 1456(2003),94
and 1566(2004).95
The scope of this principal generally implies that a victim state is not permitted to intervene
militarily in a state where terrorists are, but rather it can seek their extradition in case they
have not been prosecuted domestically.96
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2- Political Offence Exception
The Political offence is one of the exceptions to the principle of prosecute or extradite,97
which justifies states‘ refusal to extradite a political refugee.98 It is traced back to the
nineteenth century and is justified by supporting the resistance and political opposition
against dictatorships, especially if it is non-violent opposition.99 Those who fight for the sake
of democracy should be protected from the suppression of authoritarian regimes whenever
they seek an asylum in a foreign state. This state can legitimately refuse to extradite them.100
However, the political offence defies an agreed upon definition.101 It is a subjective notion
which differs from a state to another and from time to time, as ―each society tolerates
different levels of political dissidence.‖102 Most of the definitions of ―political offence‖ are
―tautologous rather than explanatory‖, because mostly they either highlight the ―political
motivation‖ or the ―political context‖ with no further explanation of what the ―political‖
element itself means.103 It raises the problem of what constitutes a political offence is,
considering the elasticity of the concept.104 A case in point is the bombing of a governmental
owned television station by a liberation movement seeking self-determination, which could
be viewed either a political offence or an ordinary crime depending on states‘ understanding
of the ―political‖ element.105

97

There are other exceptions such as Fiscal offence, which is gradually disappearing specially in terrorism sectoral treaties,
Jae-myong Koh , SUPRESSING TERRORIST FINANCING AND MONEY LAUNDERING, Springer, 59 (2006).
98
Ibid.
99
Nevertheless, the controversy emerges if this opposition tends to commit violent acts that include attacks against persons
or property. Report of UNODC: The Treatment of the Political Offence Exception in
International Anti-Terrorism Legal Instruments, 2(2004), available at
http://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_Pol_Off_Exception_UNODC_Report_Interpol_2004.doc . See also, Ethan
A. Nadel mann, Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Criminal Law, The, 31 HARV. INT‘L. LJ 37
(1990).
100
See, C. Van Den Wijnoaert, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION,
KLUWER- DEVENTER, 1-231(1980).
101
Mr Masaaki Yoshiura, Keiichi Aizawa& Hiroshi Tsutomi, REFUSAL OF MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE OR
EXTRADITION, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1999 AND RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES NO. 57 189 (2001).
102
Sarah L. Nagy, supra note 90 at. 110, 114.
103
C. Van Den Wijnoaert, supra note 100 at 95, Sarah L. Nagy, supra note 90 at110.
104
See generally, supra note 100.
105
Christopher C. Joyner, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE,
ROWMAN AND LITLEFILED, 67-68 (2005).

17

However, with the emergence of transnational terrorism, there is a growing tendency to
eliminate gradually this exception, in general, in the sectoral treaties relevant to the
suppression of terrorism in order to avoid creating a safe heaven of terrorists.106 One example
is article (11) of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings that does not recognize political offences as an exception to the prosecute or
extradite obligation, if one of the terrorist acts included in the convention is committed.107

Finally, Security Council resolution 1373 of 2001 affirms this approach through expanding
non recognition of the political exception in the context of terrorist acts to include generally
all terrorist acts; according to article 3(g) ―…..claims of political motivation are not
recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists‖. 108

3-The Evolution of the Principle aut dedere aut judicare
Eliminating the exception of the political offence is not the only evolution of prosecute or
extradite principle, but there are further evolutions. According to the principle of aut dedere
aut judicare extradition is only an option whenever a state where the perpetrator resides does
not prosecute him. However, the Lockerbie case suggests that there is a deviation from this
principle.109 According to the facts of the case, two Libyan intelligence officers were accused
of downing a Pan Am flight flying over Scotland.110
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The US, UK, France, Northern Ireland, and Libya are parties to the 1971 Montreal
Convention which under article 7 includes the obligation of prosecute or extradite. Despite
Libya‘s investigations of the incident, the US and UK informally requested the extradition of
the perpetrators, but Libya refused their request.111 As a result, the SC issued resolution 731
of 1992, which strongly condemns Libya‘s non- compliance with the requests, considering
that it ―has not yet responded effectively‖ to the requests and in ―establishing responsibility
for the terrorist acts‖.112 In a further escalation, the SC issued resolution 748 of 1992 that
considers as a ―threat to international peace and security‖ the Libyan failure to demonstrate
―by concrete actions it renunciation of terrorism‖ as well as ―the continued failure to respond
fully and effectively to the requests‖.113 Therefore, it imposed economic sanctions on Libya
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The significance of this resolution is that it could be
interpreted as a deviation from the prosecute or extradite obligation under the Montreal
Convention through the introduction of a third path that is (extradite or extradite),114
especially since SC‘s resolutions have a prevailing effect over any other international treaty
according to article (103) of the UN Charter.115 This interpretation raises a question whether
the principle of aut dedere aut judicare has turned into aut transferere that includes a
delivery to a third state (de facto extradition), which entails the Security Council as the
principle ―enforcer‖, complying with its authority under chapter VII when an act constitute a
threat to international peace and security.116
However, it was argued that the resolution fits with the existing law of extradition, as under
exceptional circumstances "the law merely operates at a different level through the
internationally sanctioned ways and means of the United Nations."117
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This could be understood through considering Libya‘s failure to act as a threat international
peace and security under SC Res 748of 1992, which permits the SC to work under Chapter
VII of the Charter.
Although the Lockerbie case is a unique one according the previous interpretation, it is not
the only case that followed this interpretation. According to the SC Res 1267 of 1999, the SC
demands that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden ―to appropriate authorities in a country
where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be
returned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested
and effectively brought to justice‖.118 At the same time this resolution considers the failure of
the Taliban to ―bring the indicted terrorists to justice‖119 as a threat to international peace and
security. Therefore, the SC decided to impose economic sanctions on the Taliban under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
This case is different from the Lockerbie case, as the perpetrators were not transferred to a
third state for prosecution, but rather after the 9/11 attacks the US traced them back in
Afghanistan as one of declared goals of the Operation Enduring Freedom.120 The US
demanded-including others-turning over Bin laden, offering two choices for the Taliban
either ―[t]hey will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.‖121
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Since neither of the demands was met,122 among other reasons,123 the US launched its
military operation Enduring Freedom. According to President Bush ―[n]one of these
demands were met. And now the Taliban will pay a price. By destroying camps and
disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new
recruits and coordinate their evil plans.‖124 This reflects the fact that the principle aut dedere
aut judicare is diminishing. It is not only replaced with aut transfere, but rather, diminished
for the favor of a military model as will be elaborated further in the next chapter.
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III. The Military Model for Combating Terrorism
The 9/11 attacks paved the way for the military model of combating terrorism to replace the
criminal justice model. This shift impacts the existing rules on the use of force, specially the
right to self-defense and the rules governing state responsibility. It triggered a debate on how
combating terrorism militarily fits within contemporary international law on the use of force
and state responsibility. In addition, it has triggered the debate on whether terrorist attacks
qualify as armed attacks that give states the right to respond in individual or collective selfdefense? This section tackles how the shift has been introduced. This is followed by a macro
analysis of the effect of this shift on the application of the right to self-defense and state
responsibility respectively. This chapter concludes that the legal framework of the use of
force has recognized more flexible interpretation of the principles on the use of force ,such as
a more lenient application of self-defense as well as introduced new principles, such as the
unwilling or unable standard.
A. The International Legal Framework of the Use of Force
The international legal system on the use of force was established under the United Nations
Charter, which prohibits the use of force under article 2(4). In analyzing the international
legal system on the use of force, international law is concerned with terrorism when it crosses
borders, as it adds, inter alia, the international element to terrorism.125 For the purpose of this
chapter, I refer to cross-border terrorist groups. The problem with the use of force after 9/11
is the extent of state involvement when combating non-state actors. It reflects the facts that
states are increasing military involvement based on lenient interpretations of the legal
framework on the use of force.
Since the United Nations is ―a unique partner in troubled times,‖ terrorism has been on the
agenda of the United Nations as a threat to international peace and security since the1970s.126
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Introducing terrorism as a main concern to UN organs has also affected the principles of the
UN Charter, namely the prohibition on the use of force. This principle, as clarified under
article 2(4) of the Charter,127 is customary international law principle and is binding on all
states. However, there are two exceptions to this binding rule, which are collective security
contained in art 42 and contained in self-defense art 51 under the UN Charter.128 The
development of this principle has stretched the exceptions of the use of force through flexible
interpretation of the Charter. According to Tams ―the international community has not
formally amended the Charter rules, but has re-appraised them through interpretation.‖129
The right to self-defense has been stretched after 9/11 based on both the 2001 SC Res 1368
and SC Res 1373, which affirm the individual and collective right to self-defense. However,
Res 1373 has not explicitly authorize the use of force, but rather under art 2 (b), it permits
―[t]ak[ing] the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts‖. 130 Nevertheless, a
broad interpretation of this resolution has been reflected in state practice that has gone far
beyond this by introducing other forms of this right, which are anticipatory and preemptive
self-defense. These forms changed or mitigated the strict requirements of the presence of this
right, especially the imminence of armed attack.131 For instance, the US uses this resolution
to legalize the use of preemptive self-defense attacks in Afghanistan even in the absence of
an immediate attack or threats of one.
Finally, there is a broadening of state responsibility to include acts of ―harboring terrorism‖
with a more mitigated threshold of the ―effective control‖ standard.132 To illustrate, states are
no longer responsible solely in case they participate, assist, or encourage terrorist acts.
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This participation is either explicitly such as the Lockerbie incident,133or implicitly as was
seen in Iran vs. Us Hostage case.134 On contrary, states can also be responsible but when
they ‗harbor‘ terrorist groups and by doing nothing to combat them. Although harboring
terrorism constitutes a failure of an international duty according to the non-binding
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States, states‘ responsibility is another field that is based on an effective
control standard, which is not fulfilled by only harboring terrorism.135
B. Military Mode Operation
The military mode operation involves a state intervening in another state where terrorists
reside to suppress those terrorists under the umbrella of the War on Terror. Military mode
operation triggers clarifying the relationship between the international law on terrorism and
international humanitarian law, which arises in limited circumstances, namely in ‗armed
conflicts‘ that require a threshold of intensity.136 Furthermore, in peace time, the sectoral
treaties that deal with certain types of terrorism should theoretically apply.137 For example,
article 19(2) of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
excludes the terrorist activities during armed conflict from being governed by the convention,
leaving them to be governed by IHL.138 The significance of this distinction lies in events of
non-international armed conflicts ―where a ‗terrorist‘ designation may act as an additional
disincentive for organized armed groups to respect IHL,‖139 especially if they can already be
prosecuted under national criminal codes.
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Many authors, such as Tams and Megret, criticize the shift in dealing with terrorism as a
phenomenon from the criminal justice strategy in which states criminalize and consider some
acts to fall under the description of terrorism to ―a military mode operation‖ which is the War
on Terror.140 This military mode is based on propagating the phobia of terrorism. To
illustrate, by manipulating the discourse of terrorism, states stretch the boundaries of
exceptions under international law on the use force to legalize their actions. In support of this
argument, other authors such as Pillay Navanethem and Susan Marks argue that not only has
the military strategy overridden the criminal one, but it has also introduced itself as the only
viable option to deter the spreading phenomenon of terrorism. This means that the
introduction of ‗no other alternatives‘ rather than the military model paves the way for
changing the structure of international law and permits the acceptance of military actions.
The language of this exceptionality implies the normality of state behavior whatever its
limits.141
In addition, basing the justification for the military model on exceptionalism entails that any
abuse to come will be random, not deliberate, aberrant and arbitrary.142 It immunizes states
from being blamed or exposed to criticism.143 This exceptionalism not only leads to
"uncritical acceptance of excessive and even illegal state responses,"144 but also helps to
sustain the circumstances on which the violations have been committed through blurring the
distinction between the default and the exception.145 This means that the exception that is the
military model will turn into being the default owing to its introduction as an inevitable shift.
Other scholarly work supported by Megret and Gred Oberleitner is evidence-based on state
practice in Afghanistan after the declared War on Terror claims that the military operation of
the War on Terror is mere a ―political phraseology‖.146
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It is about condemning terrorist attacks in newspapers as much it is about fighting a very real
war. Using the legal language of war with all its consequences aims to extend a legal
legitimatization to actions.147 It gives discursive power to states to decide who falls under the
umbrella of a ‗terrorist‘.
C. The Right to Self Defense
The right to self-defense is an exception to the prohibition of the use force under the UN
Charter in 1945. In order to analyze the developments of the legal framework for combating
terrorism, it is important to reassess its starting-point, which is the right to self-defense. The
inherent right of self-defense under article (51) of the UN Charter was recognized before
1945, under customary international law.148 According to the Caroline incident, customary
international law recognized this right irrespective of the gravity of the armed attack. 149
Customary international law crystallized the conditions governing the lawful practice of this
right.150 According to article 51 of the UN Charter, self-defense is confined to the existence
of a ‗prior armed attack‘ and the absence of the Security Council‘s response.151
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In discussion of the right to self-defense after 9/11, the starting point is the adoption of both
Resolutions 1368 and 1373. The plain reading of both resolutions suggest that they did not
explicitly authorize the extraterritorial use of force within the context of self-defense against
non-state actors. However, resolution 1373 did affirm the ‗inherent‘ right of self-defense.
The interpretation of SC resolutions 1368 and 1373in 2001, triggers a controversy. A heated
debate about the legality of stretching the right to self-defense to include preemptive and
anticipatory self-defense has emerged. This can be framed as a controversy between a
positivist and a purpose oriented interpretation of the UN Charter concerning the right to selfdefense.152 The positivists argue that according to the Charter there should be a prior armed
attack (DRC v. Uganda).153 On the other hand, those who interpret the Charter purposively
argue that an imminent threat is sufficient to trigger the practice of this right (anticipatory
self-defense). Some views go even further than this, especially after the declared War on
Terror, to exclude the imminence of such a threat by considering preemptive selfdefense.154In a further development, Yoram Dinstein introduced the concept of ―interceptive
self-defense", in response to a situation where a state has "committed itself to an armed
attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way",155 a state has the legitimate right to use force.
One of the problems, which arises when applying a purpose-oriented interpretation of article
(51) is stretching of the practice of the right to self-defense before terrorist groups. This
practice will invoke the sovereignty of the states where these groups are located, especially
since the War on Terror has ―no geographical or temporal boundaries‖. 156 This means that if
a state claims a right to self-defense against a terrorist group, which resides in more than one
country, it can argue that it has the right to intervene in those countries where the terrorists
reside.
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Finally, this can lead to expanding the exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force in
international law and especially the conditions,157 the temporal scope and necessary threshold
required for practicing self-defense.158
In addition, since reprisals are prohibited under international law, broadening the parameters
of self-defense can be used as a substitute for use of force practices. 159 At the same time, it
could serve international law enforcement purposes such as the Russian attack on Georgia in
2008.160 This state practice supports Christine Gray‘s description of the right to self-defense
as a ―ritual incantation of a magic formula,‖161 as well as Daniel Bethlehem‘s statement
on―[t]he reliance by States on self-defense in virtually every conceivable circumstance,
which in turn had led to normative drift, as attempts have been made to stretch the
concept‖.162 Both arguments highlight the manipulation of self-defense as an exception to the
prohibition of the use of force, through expanding its boundaries.
In the following analysis of the development of the right to self-defense, I analyze the two
main requirements in terms of their application to the War on Terror, namely the existence of
an armed attack and the absence of Security Council measures.
1. The Existence of an Armed Attack
The existence of armed attack is the first of two requirements for the right to self-defense. In
order to decide whether a situation triggers the right to self-defense, there are two questions
to be answered: first, whether there is an armed attack and second, who launched this
―attack‖-a state or non-state actor?163
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Although article 51 of the UN Charter does not include a definition of what constitutes an
‗armed attack‘ in the context of practicing the right to self-defense, the ICJ in its judgments
has adopted the ―scale and effect‖ of the attack as the determining factors.164 The concept of
‗armed attack‘ according to article 51 of the UN Charter implies a specific scale that has been
crystallized in judicial precedents of the ICJ. According to these precedents, the scale of use
of force should be grave ‗enough‘ and not only a minor threat Oil Platforms case,165 DRC v.
Uganda,166 Nicaragua case.167 In addition, the Boundary Commission of Eritrea/Ethiopia
affirmed the same scale by differentiating between ―geographically limited clashes‖ and
armed attacks that trigger right of self-defense.168 However, the interpretation of an ‗armed
attack‘ still triggers a controversy. Professor Henkin considers an ―actual armed attack [to
be] unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open to misinterpretation or
fabrication.‖169
Moreover, there is an emerging opinion, expressed by the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial Executions in 2013, that ―the level of violence necessary to justify a resort to
self-defense ought to be set higher when it is in response to an attack by non-State actors than
to an attack by another State.‖170 This point of view is compatible with sovereignty, a
cornerstone of international law as well as limiting the manipulation of the discourse of
terrorism. It is important to note that it is not only the nature of the act that determines its
gravity, but also its impact. Some incidents might not appear grave on the surface, but their
impact might be grave enough to qualify them as armed attacks. That is why determining the
severity of the attack is one of the challenging dimensions of the right to self-defense.
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(i) Method of Delivery
The method of delivery also is an important factor for qualifying a right to self-defense. The
criterion for defining the term terrorists suggest a debate over whether terrorists‘ actions
qualify as a justification for practicing the right to self-defense or not. The method of
delivering terrorism could be a state, state representative, a group effectively controlled by a
state DRC v. Uganda,171 Nicaragua case,172 and Iran hostage case,173 or non-state actors
such as terrorist / rebel groups. Although the plain meaning of article 51 of the United
Nations Charter does not specify that the attack or threat must be attributable to ―a state‖ in
order to trigger the practice of self-defense,174 the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Israeli
Security Wall, clarified that the right to self-defense can only be practiced by a state in
response to an attack by another state, ―by one State against another State.‖175
However, much earlier than the United Nations Charter, in the year 1837, the Caroline
incident involved British colonists fighting against Canadian rebels (non-state actors).176
This incident reveals how the right to self-defense was recognized in response to attacks by
non-state actors Canadian rebels.177 This position has evolved to include quasi states. A
case in point is the fact finding mission on conflict between Georgia, Russia and the
autonomous areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The commission found that Article 51 of
the Charter applicable to the situation without any reference to further agreements between
the parties.178 The reasoning of the mission seems to consider both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as quasi-States.179
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In addition, when Russia attacked the Chechens rebels in Georgia most of the third states
neither condemned nor accepted the Russian actions despite the fact that the Russian
territory did not suffer from an imminent armed attack.180
For the international community, this response to incidents of state practice involving
extraterritorial use of force attempts to assess whether the incident fits into the parameters of
necessity and proportionality of the right to self-defense rather than debating its existence
itself.181 One example is the mixed states‘ response to the Israeli claim when it attacked
Lebanon in 2006. There was broad agreement that Israel‘s response had been
disproportionate, while a considerable number of states recognized -in principle- the right to
use force against Hezbollah.182 This example shows the shift to assessing the scope of selfdefense compared to the condemnation of similar actions in the 1970s and 1980s.183 This
reflects the relaxed application of the right to self-defense after 9/11 to the extent that the
questions shifted from whether there is right to self-defense against non-state actors to
whether the response is proportionate and necessary enough or not?
(ii) Proof of Imminence
Proof of imminence is another requirement for the right to self-defense. In order to define ―if
an armed attack occurs‖ under article 51 of the UN Charter, the imminence of the armed
attack must be determined. There must be clear, decisive, and transparent evidence of such
immediacy and not non-evidence based on expectations. For example, the US depended on
CIA investigations that suggested that there ―might‖ be an attack before its attacks on
Afghanistan.184
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In this case, the CIA should have been transparent in disclosing relevant and sufficient
evident before a higher entity such as the Security Council for evaluation. This would avoid
the manipulation and personal assessment of threats and thereby respects the sovereignty of
states.
The concept of imminence was defined under the Caroline incident as ―instant and
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."185 For
example, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, or a nuclear
program in itself cannot be an imminent threat unless there is credible evidence that these
weapons will be used in a specific, imminent attack. Although it is important to secure the
source of evidence for security purposes, ―one official argument for not disclosing the
proof allegedly held by US authorities cannot extend to withholding crucial evidence
used to justify the massive bombing of a state.‖186 This is to say that the right to security
of a state that has chosen not to disclose the evidence used to justify attacking other
states is not an acceptable reason to prove the imminence of threats.
Finally, the use of military force even for combating terrorism should be under explicit
authorization from the Security Council in cases that fit within the permissible boundaries of
the use of force. Thus, any military use of force without such authorization is unlawful.
Unfortunately, this has not always been the case.
2. The Absence of Security Council Measures
The absence of the SC‘s measures is the other pillar for the right to self-defense. According
to understanding of the right to self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
self-defense is an interim measure,187 in the absence of the Security Council measures. This
point questions whether SC Res 1373 is a sufficient measure. This Resolution involves
obligations to freeze terrorist assets and calls upon member states to create a committee for
monitoring its implementation.

185

Edward Gordon, Article 2 (4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT‘L L. 271, p 227, 228 (1984).
Frederic Megret, supra note 7 at 381.
187
Ibid.
186

32

Although these Measures do not include military measures, there is nothing in the Charter
that only recognizes military measures as being adequate to handle threats to international
peace and security.188 In addition, there is nothing in the Charter that prevents the
Security Council from explicitly mandating the use of self-defense.189 For example,
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the SC authorized the coalition to use ―all necessary
means to uphold and ‗implement‘ a previous resolution recognizing a right to selfdefense.‖190 Self-defense in this context serves as a mechanism for combating a
violation of international peace and security.191
Irrespective of the debate that emerged after this Resolution, it is clear from its
language that it was precise and explicit in its authorization of the practice of the right
to self-defense. This was not the case in resolutions 1368 and Resolution 1373.192
Considering the significance and impact of these two resolutions, they do not explicitly
include authorization of a right to self-defense. Thus, many questions on the legality of
the use of force of subsequent military operations that were based on those resolutions
such as Operation Enduring Freedom are raised.
D. Terrorism and State Responsibility
Since states can only be responsible for the acts of their agents, the interrelation between
terrorism and state responsibility is debatable within the context of the War on Terror.193
Attributing the acts of a state‘s agents to states was clear in Libya‘s responsibility for the
Lockerbie incident in 1988, because the persons responsible for the attack were working
for Libyan intelligence services.194 This was also affirmed by the ICJ judgments in the
Iran Hostage case.195
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Not only has the contemporary international law on the use of force changed, but also the
international law on state responsibility for terrorism since 9/11. The threshold of state
responsibility was an effective control of terrorist groups combined with participation on the
states side through assisting them financially or militarily, committing, facilitating, or
inciting, which conforms to the general rules of state responsibility. However, after the SC
Res 1373, a state can be held responsible for terrorist acts perpetrated in other states by a
terrorist group residing in its territory, even if the state lacks effective control over this group.
This is seen as harboring terrorism, specifically a change in the rules of attribution.196
1. Attribution
Attribution is a core element for states‘ responsibility that is interrelated with the right to
self-defense. Generally, the right to self-defense can be triggered against another state
whenever the later exercises ―effective control‖ over non- state actors residing on its territory
who mount an attack on another state.197 In a further development, there are other arguments
that also consider the ―overall control‖ standard as a trigger for self-defense.198 This is to say
that it is sufficient to trigger a responsibility of a state whenever it exercises overall control
over terrorists. There is a point of view that favors the application of one of those previous
standards over the other according to the level of organization of the non-state actors.199 To
illustrate, if the non- state actors have a high level of organization with an identified leader it
tends to fall under the ‗overall control‘ test.200 This is because an ―unorganized‖ group would
require more direct state involvement that qualifies ―effective control‖ as a higher standard of
attribution than the overall standard.201
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This distinction seems plausible, especially since the phenomenon of terrorism affects many
parts of the whole world. Therefore, if it is opened to the state to decide which standard is
applicable, the door to manipulations is open. In addition, adopting the ―overall control‖ will
generally jeopardize the sovereignty of states as well as threaten the principle of the
prohibition on the use of force.
After 9/11 attacks the US launched operation Enduring Freedom against Al Qaida in
Afghanistan. The reasoning behind such operation was that the Taliban regime was
―sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists‘ and that Al Qaeda had ―great influence
in Afghanistan and support[ed] the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country.‖202
This incident is significant because it introduced new rules of attribution than those of state
responsibility under contemporary international law. Its consideration was affirmed by Tams
when he stated that: ―[s]tates invoking self-defense do make an effort to identify links
between the territorial state and the terrorist organization in question.‖203
In a further development to the rules of attribution, a more flexible standard has been
introduced which is ―harboring‖ terrorism. This standard excludes the direct relationship
between a state and non-state actor as a basis for state responsibility. It adopts a lower
standard which is merely harboring the presence of the terrorists. This means that the
effective control standard is replaced with a more mitigated version of attribution that is
harboring.204 For example, the US, with the assistance of the UK intervened in Afghanistan
based on the Taliban regime‘s refusal to surrender Bin Laden.205 The coalition considered
such refusal as falling under ‗harboring terrorism‘, and thus, invoked the right to selfdefense.206
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Although this was not the first use of force against terrorists, it is the first not to be
condemned.207 A case in point is Israel‘s use of force in Lebanon in 1968, which was
justified on the grounds that Lebanon had allowed terrorists to train on their territory and
thus, was harboring terrorism. In spite of the Israeli‘s and the US interpretations, the Israeli
attacks were condemned by the SC Res 262 in 1968.208 Furthermore, similar actions took
place in 1985 in Tunis, which were described as acts of aggression by 14 out of 15 of the
members of the SC in Res 573 in 1985.209
Unlike in the past when these actions were condemned, this time both France and the UK and
the U.S vetoed the resolution condemning their actions.210 Therefore, here lies the shift from
condemnation of similar action to their tolerance and finally adoption of new rules that place
―a face of legitimacy‖ over state practice; that is the new concept of ―harboring terrorism‖.
Attributing terrorist action to a state based on the ―harboring terrorism‖ standard is usually
associated with triggering the right to self-defense. For this reason, this responsibility of a
state harboring terrorism as a wrongful act allows another state to defend itself when these
terrorist acts occur on their soil.211 In other words the UK Attorney General pointed out that
―self-defense can be used against those ‗who plan and perpetrate [terrorist] acts and against
those who harbor [terrorists] if that is necessary to avert further such terrorist acts.‖212 This
opinion has been ‗implicitly‘ affirmed by the ICJ in its judgments in the Armed Activities
case,213 when it considered the Congolese inaction concerning the attacks by the rebel group
against Uganda as not reflecting toleration for those actions, because Congo was unable to
halt these attacks.214
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This discussion of the inaction of states leads to the case of failed states. A failed state “can
no longer perform basic functions such as education, security, or governance, usually due to
fractious violence or extreme poverty.‖215 For these reasons, a failed state leaves a ―power
vacuum‖ that is easily exploited by non-state actors that can lead to the launch of attacks
against other states.216 When this occurs, attribution becomes pointless because a failed state
has neither effective nor overall control over the rebels/terrorists.217
2. Unable or Unwilling
The concept of being unwilling or unable is a new introduced standard of attribution
justifying extra territorial use of force. These incidents of states practice suggest that there is
a tendency to replace the rules of state responsibility, especially the ones on attribution to the
―unwilling or unable‖ standard.
This means that if a state cannot or is not willing to prevent terrorist attacks operating from
its territory, the victim state is authorized to intervene in order to combat terrorists.218 The
problem with this new standard is that it lowers the existing standard of attribution as well as
leaves a state no choice but to cooperate with the aggressor or be found unwilling.219
Introducing this new applicable standard of unwilling or unable coincides with states‘
flexibility in tolerating military operations whenever they are conducted under the ‗unable or
unwilling‘ standard. At the same time, tolerance does not usually reach the level of ―actively‖
supporting or legitimizing these military operations.
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Thus, it suggests that many states might tolerate operations under an unable or unwilling
standard without positively endorsing these operations.220 However, it may be too early to
tell whether this tolerance constitutes opinio juris amending the existing standard through
customary international law, because state practice has not reached a sufficient level of
consistency.221 Tracing the evolution of the rules of attribution after 9/11 as we have done
here, it is clear that the legal rules have begun to lean toward ―a more lenient standard of
attribution.‖222
E. The War on Terror
After analyzing the developments in the right to self-defense and state responsibility, it is
important to determine whether the declared War on Terror only mirrors these changes or has
moved beyond it. This declared ―War on Terror‖ is a war where only the defendants are
known while terrorists can be whoever the defendants choose them to be through the
―demonizing and dehumanizing of anyone declared to be a possible terrorist.‖223 For
example, the US response after 9/11 was to announce ―a different kind of war against a
different kind of enemy‖.224 This means that the war has no geographical or temporal scope,
according to ex-President Bush who has said that, ―[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda,
but it does not end there‖.225This reflects a shift towards expanding the right to self-defense
to an extreme where a declared War on Terror is given ‗carte blanche‟ to act as a state deems
―necessary‖. Using the word ―war‖ to describe military operations under the term War on
Terror suggests a tendency to escape the actual constraints of international law. This happens
through revisiting ―the temporal and spatial coordinates‖ of the right to self-defense through
loosening the framework of ―collective security‖.226
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It serves to ―distort‖ any of the other alternatives to terrorism, especially through a criminal
justice model.227 This shift to the ‗War on Terror‘ seeks to avoid the veto dilemma that
reflects the conflicting interests of the five permanent member of the SC. 228 This means that
it happens that the contracting interests of the P5 impedes the issuance of a SC resolution
through a veto power, but under the carte blanch of the War on Terror, state escape this
problem through acting unilaterally. For example, it was argued that because the SC
sometimes gets paralyzed by the veto, states could act unilaterally under the claim of urgency
to tackle a threat to international peace and security.229 This might create a parallel system
that subordinates the SC‘s expected role.
In addition, it avoids the strict requirements of self-defense under customary international
law which requires the occurrence of an armed attack or an imminent threat of an armed
attack as well as restricts states‘ practice of self-defense to that of absolute necessity. This is
after the heated debate against the legality of preemptive self-defense credo of the Bush
doctrine.230 In this way, this new war has moved beyond expanding the scope of the right to
self-defense to further legitimizing the unilateral military acts.
This shift as was analyzed in this chapter portrays a linear development, starting with
condemnation of acts, then silence or a ‗muted response‘ sometimes combined with tolerance
and finally ‗positive endorsement‘ of the actions.
To illustrate, one example of condemnation is when the US attacked a pharmaceutical plant
in Sudan and in Afghanistan in the response to the 1998 attacks on the American embassies
in both Kenya and Tanzania, claiming that they were exploited by terrorists.231 The US
justified its attack by referring to the right to self-defense under article 51 of UN Charter.232
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The U.S did not address whether there was any involvement on the part of Sudan in the
attack on the American embassies. The attacks on the embassies were not attributed to Sudan
in any way. This is despite the fact that the US violated Sudan‘s sovereignty by launching an
attack on a pharmaceutical plant on Sudanese territory.233 States‘ reactions to the attacks
were mixed. Mostly the acts were condemned, especially the ones occurring in Sudan or
tacitly approved.234
Further, one example of the ― muted response‖ was in the 1990s when Iran used the same
basis that is article 51 of the UN Charter to attack Iraqi territory in the fight against the
Mujahedin-E Khalq Organization (MKO) that resided in Iraq. There was little evidence that
the terrorist actions were attributable to Iraq.235 Although Iraq considered these attacks as an
act of aggression by Iran, a considerable number of states did not condemn them.236
Furthermore, a few years after the 9/11 attacks, namely in 2004, Russia used extraterritorial
force against Chechen rebels in Georgia. Although this action was a controversial one, there
was ―no principled condemnation that would have denied Russia‘s right to use force
extraterritorially.‖237However, this muted response has been further developed to ―positive
endorsement‖ after 9/11. This is to say that many third States have ―affirmatively endorsed‖
several operations such as the US intervention in Afghanistan (2001), the Israeli intervention
in Lebanon (2006), the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia (2006), and recently the French
intervention in Mali (2012).238
These incidents, irrespective of the debates on their legality and the different facts on
grounds, reflect the fact that the majority of states‘ reactions today are accepted as a matter of
principle, states can invoke the principle of self-defense against terrorist attacks not
imputable to another state.‖239
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To conclude, the change in the legal framework for combating terrorism by the 9/11 is
significant to the extent that it can be described as a new era. This era changed what were
previously exceptions to defaults. This is not a positive turn as ―the last thing international
law needs at this stage is more exceptions to the principle that less not more war is the
best way to achieve international peace and security.‖240 This era is still open to ongoing
evolution, especially in a world full of complicated international relations confused and
governed by competing interests. That is why it would be disastrous in case ―the dangers
associated with non-state actors were used as a pretext to pry open the corpus of interstate rules, without replacing these rules with anything more sensible.‖ 241The next
chapter analyzes these changes, especially those that grown to affect collective security.
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IV.

Collective Security and the War on Terror

The United Nations is the core actor of collective security, but lacks the characteristics of
world government.242 The effect of the declared War on Terror has extended to diminish
collective security.243 I address the literature on the effect of the War on Terror on collective
security through international law mechanisms, namely SC Res 1373 of 2001.244
Understanding this resolution through the lens of international law, on the one hand reveals
that the fight against terrorism has become a ―catalyst‖ for broader interpretation of the
Security Council‘s functions.245 On the other hand, in the long run it can arguably lead to a
diminished role for the United Nations to play in collective security. The following sections
discuss how the War on Terror has considerably influenced collective security through the
legitimate mechanisms of international law.246 First, the Security Council is no longer– in
practice- the only authority determining what constitutes a threat to international peace and
security. Second, the SC went beyond its mandate through legislating under SC Res 1373 of
2001 as well as became stronger executive through establishing the Counter Terrorism
Committee (CTC).247 Finally, there is a tendency of a deviation from the collective security
created by the UN.
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The first time the SC used the term ―terrorism‖ was Resolution 579 of 1985.248 In 1989, the
Security Council issued Resolution 635 on the occasion of the Lockerbie case, putting
terrorism on top of the Security Council‘s agenda.249
Although SC resolutions before 9/11 had described some incidents as terrorism, they did not
impose measures against terrorism on states.250 For example, there were grave actions like
the hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe in 1976 and the attack on Israeli athletes at
Munich.251 However, none of these incidents triggered SC action like 9/11 has.252 Before
9/11, the sanctions remained the most recognized response of the Council to terrorism such
as sanctions in the 1990s imposed against Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan. Since 9/11, the
Council has not used sanctions in response to terrorism, except for the continuation of the
previously imposed ones such as sanctions against members of al Qaeda.253 This shift can
arguably be justified considering that sanctions ultimately work better against states, while
their application against transnational terrorist networks seems to be less effective because
the ―target‖ is most of the time moving.254
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A. Collective Security and Threats to International Peace and Security
A ―threat to international peace and security‖ is a purely political question and is not a legal
one.255A threat to peace reflects a ―judgment based on factual findings and the weighing of
political considerations that cannot be measured by legal criteria.‖256According to Article 39
of the UN Charter the SC ―determine[s] the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and [to] make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security‖.257 As a result, the
SC is empowered to issue binding resolutions on member states to confront these types of
threats in order to maintain international peace and security. Hans Kelsen argues that the
term ―threat to peace [...] allows[s] a highly subjective interpretation‖. 258 Nevertheless, he
contends that ―it is completely within the discretion of the Security Council as to what
constitutes a threat to the peace‖.259
The concept of ―threat to peace and Security‖ is evolving under the UN system.260 The
drafting history of article 39 reflects an understanding of threats to peace and security in a
narrow sense, including use of force by an organized military force in the context of armed
conflict.261 However, the changing environment including the emergence of non-state actors
expanded the interpretation of threats to international peace and security under article 39 of
the UN Charter.262 This was affirmed by the president of the Security Council in 1992, when
he declared that ―[t]he absence of war and military conflicts among States does not in itself
ensure international peace and security.
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The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological
fields have become threats to peace and security.‖263 For example, under specific
circumstances, failure to extradite designated persons is considered a threat to international
peace and security.264 Starting from 2003, the Security Council considered ―all acts‖ of
―terrorism‖ irrespective of being qualified ‗international‘ as threats to international peace and
security.265 It equalizes international and national terrorist acts as being threats to
international peace and security. This tendency of the Security Council implies that ―any act‖
falling under the notion of terrorism is a threat to international peace and security. However,
there is no agreed upon definition of terrorism and even the Security Council itself has not
adopted an exact definition of terrorism. This leaves one of two possible interpretations. The
first, the plain reading of the adopted Security Council resolutions,266 whenever the Council
describes an act as terrorism it is a threat to international peace and security. The second uses
a the broader understanding of the language of the resolutions,267 by considering ―any act‖
terrorism regardless of who designates it as such- whether the Security Council or states - as
a threat to international peace and security. The first interpretation of the Council‘s practice
seems more plausible rather than the second for two reasons. First, lacking an agreed upon
definition of terrorism leaves relative interpretation of the notion by states open. Second,
states can take advantage of the subsequent legal consequences of considering ―all acts‖ as
threats to international peace and security without Security Council resolutions.
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To illustrate, if there is no agreed upon definition of terrorism, considering that all acts of
terrorism are threats to international peace and security according to the SC, states can
shares in a way the absolute authority of the SC of what constitute a threat to international
peace and security, which implies grave legal consequences. These legal consequences can
extend to the use of extraterritorial force without the Security Council‘s authorization, which
neutralizes the role played by the SC.268 As a result, creates a parallel system to the UN
embodied in the fall of collective security favoring unilateral use of force without the SC
authorization.
B. Expanding the Security Council‟s Competences
The dispute over expanding the Security Council‘s competences heavily emerged after
9/11,269 namely after SC Res 1373of 200.This resolution as the ―single most powerful
response,‖270 in the fight against terrorism added a global perspective to the fight, broadened
its implementation, created more blurred boundaries between national and international
issues, and obligated all member states to take measures to fight terrorism including
amending criminal codes in order to forestall terrorist actions in a way that copes with this
resolution.271 It is argued that the collective security system created by the UN has positively
developed in an unprecedented way right after 9/11 through developing tools that were
―hardly conceivable‖ before 9/11.272
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These tools include establishing the CTC that is strong executive machinery targeting both
states and individuals.273 In addition to this, imposing general obligation on states implies a
―legislative‖ character that transformed the Council into a world legislator.274
1.

The Security Council‟s Administrative Role

The SC Res 1373 established the CTC in order to serve three purposes. First, it strengthens
the counter-terrorism capacity of the member states, as it adds an administrative role to the
Security Council, which is following up on the implementation of the resolution. Second, it
offers technical assistance to states carrying out counter-terrorism mandates through acting as
a ―broker‖ for facilitating the implementation of the resolution.275 Finally, it monitors the
implementation of the resolution through calling states to submit reports displaying their
fulfillment of the obligations under the resolution.276 This administrative role has developed
the Sanctions Committee established under 1999 SC Res 1267 through following up the
listing system that addresses specific individuals and organizations on the ground of both SC
resolutions 1269 and 1373.277 These functions of the CTC altogether with the sanctions
committee are considered as a ―novelty‖ in the face of the traditional actions of the SC,
which suggest that the Security Council is becoming a stronger executive.278
2.

The Security Council as a “Legislator”

The Security Council as a legislator means creating new, general, and mandatory norms
under chapter VII of the Charter.279 Both resolutions1368 and 1373, emerge from the UN
Security Council powers to issue mandatory resolutions grounded in Chapter VII of the
Charter.280
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The language of Security Council Res 1368281 paved the way for obligations under Security
Council Res 1373.282 It used ―threat to peace‖ instead of ―armed attack‖. However, it affirms
the ―inherent‖ right of self-defense in the context of combating terrorism.283 Two results
emerged from chapter VII in response to terrorism, namely sanctions lists,284 and legislative
action.
For the legislative actions, Resolution 1373 of (2001) meets the criteria of legislation in the
sense of law making.285 According to Ramraj et. al, these criteria are: the unilateral action of
the Council while legislating, the intention of creating mandatory norms under Chapter VII
of the Charter, norms being general and not relating to a specific incidents and finally new
norms.286 The plain reading of Resolution 1373 and specifically the preamble shows that it
adopted general rules. It refers to ―such attacks‖ instead of ―these attacks‖.287 It also included
three sets of general obligations that require states to refrain from providing support to
terrorists.288
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The binding nature of the resolution is affirmed though the establishment of the Counter
Terrorism Committee (CTC).289 The Security Council used the Committee to monitor the
implementation of binding and non-binding resolutions on terrorism.290
The uniqueness of Security Council Res 1373 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is that it
is the first resolution to establish an ―anti-terrorism agenda‖ that addresses all member
states.291 Literature on the implications of UN Security Council Res 1373 concerns placing
obligations on member states to fulfill. However, less has been said on the competence of the
Security Council to issue such a resolution that entails a legislative nature.292 Andrea Bianchi
argues that the Security Council has gone beyond its original mandate as ―a peace enforcer
under Chapter VI or a dispute settler under Chapter VII‖ through laying down legal
obligations of a general character that are quasi legislation.293 This argument is supported by
Judge Fitzmaurice‘s dissenting opinion in the ICJ‘s Advisory Opinion on Namibia, who
stated that, the Security Council‘s mandate: ―was to keep the peace and not to change the
world order.‖294 In addition, Bianchi contends that the quasi-legislative nature of the Security
Council has continued to be practiced by the Security Council in other resolutions such as
Res 1540 of 2004 concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.295 The
existence of restrictions on the Security Council‘s action was emphasized in 1995 in the
Tadic case when the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that: ―there exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact
laws directly binding on international legal subjects‖.296
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At the same time, there are contending arguments that the legislative authority by the
Security Council is compatible with the UN Charter because there is nothing that prohibits
this authority or limits the measures taken by the Security Council to tackle threats to peace
and security.297 This opinion is based on the perception that what is not prohibited is
generally allowed. It is also justified based on the fact that the powers of the Council are not
exhaustive and that the obligations under Res 1373 fit within state obligations to implement
mandatory resolutions.298 This was supported by the ICTY in the Tadic case when it stated
that the Council ―has a broad discretion in deciding on the course of action and evaluating the
appropriateness of the measures to be taken.‖299 The Court emphasized that ―[i]t is evident
that the measures set out in Article 41 are merely illustrative examples which obviously do
not exclude other measures. All the Article requires is that they do not involve ―the use of
force.‖300 This means that the legislative resolutions by the Council do not contradict the
authority given to it under the Charter, because it leaves the choice of the suitable means to
the Security Council itself, which involves ―political evaluation of highly complex and
dynamic situations‖.301
There are several problems with Security Council Res1373. First, the plain reading of the
Charter suggests that the Security Council has not explicitly been mandated to use a
legislative authority, especially the Council as a legislator is not similar to other
―institutionalized forms of decision making‖ at a universal level.302 To illustrate, the
difference exist in the lack of the ability to ―opt out‖ which is found in a treaty that confirms
that states cannot be bound unless they agree. This is not the case if the Security Council is
legislating because the United Nation Charter does not permit member states to opt out from
the application of decisions under chapter VII of the Charter.303
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Second, the resolution‘s legislative nature contradicts with the legality principle, as it creates
new rules that the member states should know before they decide to join the UN Charter.304
Third, the CTC has left a space for states to carve out their own definition of terrorism
unilaterally, which allows manipulation.305
Forth, the unbalanced structure of the Security Council, which has permanent members with
a veto power, implies that the resolution will never be ‗at odds‘ with any of their interests.306
That is to say, the lack of representation in the Security Council under the hegemony of the
five permanent members, who are in charge of monitoring the implementation of Resolution
1373, gives these members the authority to redraw the uses of collective security based on
their own interests.307 Fifth, there is no international mechanism for reviewing the legality of
Council‘s resolutions especially since when the Security Council legislates depends mainly
on ‗unstated premises‘ that any action taken during the fight against terrorism is inevitably
―legitimate‖.308
Finally, although the resolution has obligatory nature vis-à-vis state members according to
the UN Charter, the Security Council mandatory decisions are not one of the formal sources
creating international law under art 38 of the ICJ Statute.309 However, Security Council Res
1373 and the subsequent resolution 1540 of 2004 may reflect state practice opnio juris on the
grounds that they were adopted unanimously as well as they have been accepted and
supported by the General Assembly.310
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As a result, this might assert the interpretation of the Council is a world legislator.
Furthermore, applying the rules included in the resolution over time could establish
‗precedent‘ that constitutes the specificity which is important to provide effective
implementation mechanism.311
C. Diminishing Collective Security After the War on Terror
The role of the United Nations in maintaining security is a unique one as it has established a
collective security system. This system has been at stake several times since 9/11.312
Although the language of Res 1373 favors the criminal justice model rather than the military
one while fighting against terrorism, as it did not explicitly authorized military force, it
recognized the inherent right to self-defense.313 The collective security has been neutralized
in the War on Terror314 while unilateral action has prevailed.315 The various interpretations of
the recognition of the right to self-defense in Security Council resolution 1373 triggered a
controversy.
On the one hand, it is argued that Res 1373 has not authorized the use of force against
terrorists, because there is no explicit authorization under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
recognition of the right to self-defense is included in the preamble of the resolution and not in
its operative part.316 In addition, the expression "combat by all means" exists in the context of
cooperation and coordination between states involving non use of force measures. This is not
the case of the formula of acting under Chapter VII which was clearly seen in the Gulf and
Korean wars, where the Council explicitly referred to North Korea and the Iraq as the
―target‖ of military use of force.317
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On the other hand, it can be argued that the mere inclusion of the recognition of the right to
self-defense in the resolution implies exemption from the prohibition on the use of force by
the Council.318 In addition, it also means that in critical situations, the resolution serves as a
guideline for legalizing the use of force.319 This argument is supported by a precedent
established by Security Council Resolution 661 of 1990 on the occasion of Iraq‘s invasion of
Kuwait, in which the right to self-defense is included in the preamble and not in the operative
part. However, the council admitted third states‘ use force against Iraq in an application of
collective self-defense.320
Although unilateral use of force has been a highly contested feature of international relations
before 9/11, such as for example, in relation to the US interventions in Panama, post-9/11 has
witnessed ―less disputed‖ examples of state practice indicating that force is being used
unilaterally. A case in point is the US‘ Operation Enduring Freedom,321 which was neither
an example of explicit authorization of the use of force by the Security Council, nor ―an
enforcement action of collective security‖,322 but rather the US justified the operation on the
grounds of lenient interpretation of the right to self-defense as referred to in Res 1373 to
include preemptive self-defense.323 However, the same argument was rejected by the Council
as a legal foundation for invading Iraq in 2003. This distinction reflects that the Council is
becoming ―a forum for debating self-defense issues, even though its imprimatur was not
needed for the use of force by member states‖.324
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There are other examples of state practice in the post-9/11 period, which indicates the force is
being used unilaterally when the Security Council is marginalized. In 2004 and 2007,
Russian forces used force extraterritorially in Georgia unilaterally in their fight against
Chechen rebels without Security Council authorization.325 In 2008, Colombia followed the
same strategy in Ecuador in order to combat terrorists.326 Finally, the US led coalition against
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq is not backed by Security Council
authorization, but is justified based on the Iraqi president‘s invitation.327According to
Gray,328 the consent of a state is not enough to legalize the use of force extraterritorially in
civil wars except under the Security Council authorization or counter interventions.329
Therefore, 9/11 has introduced a new form of legalizing intervention beyond the Security
Council‘s authorization. These practices suggest a deviation from the collective security
framework of the UN in confronting threats to international peace and security, including
terrorism. This is clear through the Security Council‘s responses to terrorism where it deals
with ―travel bans but not with criminal prosecution; with the freezing of funds but not with
the identification of the targets; with arms embargoes but not with the sharing of
intelligence…..it is excluded from the military action taken against terrorism‖.330 This leaves
the UN in a position to play a ‗cosmetic‘ role in legitimizing unilateral actions, which
threatens the legitimacy of the Security Council itself.331
To sum up, Security Council Res 1373 has become the new version of international
governance through the obligatory nature of Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter.332 In addition, the international system has paved a new way
to ―forcibly export and import law, and thus policy via international institutions.‖333
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This legislative power adds a third dimension to the power matrix that allows policies ―to
flow from an international level to the national level, and vice versa.‖ 334 Some authors such
as Scheppele go further than this by describing the impact of the UNSC Res 1373 as
―international state of emergency,‖335 owing to the power extracted from the Resolution to
the UN Security Council. It seems plausible to observe the implications of this resolution
including the expansion of the extraterritorial use of force against terrorists as not only
tolerable, but as inevitable.336 This change in the collective security system reflects a
deviation from the multilateral system created by the United Nations in 1945 in favor of
powerful states.337 This change preceded harbingers of changes such as the 1999 NATO
bombing in Kosovo. It represents a deterioration of the system created by the UN Charter for
Simon Chesterman and Michael Byers who note that:
Global situation has begun to resemble that of previous centuries, where military force
was the preferred tool of the powerful, and the less powerful sought protection in alliances
of convenience rather than international institutions and international law. Most
disturbingly, the system created in 1945 to preserve peace and security has been seriously
compromised.338
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V. The Development of the International Law‟s Framework for
Combating Terrorism After the Arab Spring
Case Study: Syria
Since crisis can trigger a change in the structure of international law339 especially when security
is at stake, it is insightfully important to analyze how the Arab Spring340 generally and the Syrian
case specifically has affected the structure of international law governing terrorism. The changes
in the legal framework for combating terrorism as demonstrated in previous chapters are
embodied in the Syrian case. It is a case where every involved actor appropriated these changes
to justify its position on the ground that these changes become acceptable through state practice
since 9/11. These actors are the Syrian regime, US led Coalition, and Russia. Each of the actors
in the conflict has its own conceptualization of who ―the terrorists‖ are. In this chapter, I will not
analyze all of the rebel groups that fall under the definition of terrorism. I will thus use ISIL as a
model that has been recognized by many states including, by all of the actors in the conflict, as a
terrorist organization.341 This will allow analyzing how the War on Terror discourse has been
appropriated in the Syrian conflict.
Although the Arab Spring began with high hopes of democracy, the outcome is far from ideal.342
The evolution of the Arab Spring‘s developments has not been the same for all countries; some
states have reached closer towards democracy, while others have turned to civil war. From the
perspective of international law, some states, like Tunisia and Egypt, have not gone through
military interventions by other states. Thus, they are not- in principle- of a concern to
international law.
339
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On the other hand, states like Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Syria are engulfed in the turmoil of civil
wars that have triggered in a way military intervention. This is to say, ―[w]hat began as another
Arab Spring uprising against an autocratic ruler has mushroomed into a brutal proxy war that has
drawn in regional and world powers.‖343 These four conflicts raise many legal questions, such as
the legality of the NATO intervention in Libya,344 the legality of operation ―Decisive Storm‖ in
Yemen in a challenge to the ―negative equality‖ doctrine,345 the extraterritorial use of force in
Iraq based on invitation by the government,346 and the extraterritorial use of force in Syria with
or without state consent, in the absence of Security Council authorization. The ongoing turmoil
in these four countries has paved the way for the emergence of terrorist groups which take
advantage of the power vacuum. In addition, ―Western states‖ War on Terror has extended to
those countries by taking advantage of this turmoil. Their intervening in other states is justified
on different legal basis such as state invitation, fighting terrorism, or humanitarian intervention.
The significance of these cases is that they have ‗skewed‘ the ‗normative understanding‘ 347 of
some core international law principles such as the prohibition of the use of force and the negative
equality doctrine.
Building on the evolution of the legal framework for combating terrorism discussed in the
previous chapters, the Syrian conflict is instructive, in this regard.348 The uniqueness of the
Syrian case stems from the exploitation of the War on Terror either at the national level by the
Syrian regime and at the international level by states intervening in Syrian territory particularly,
the international US led Coalition and Russia. However, each one of these actors justifies its
resort to the War on Terror on a different legal basis.
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This variation in legal argument justifies analyzing the Syrian case to test the legality of this
reasoning, based on the change of the rules on the use of force, state responsibility, and
collective security. I argue in this case study that the War on Terror discourse has been
―appropriated‖ to the Syrian conflict. Fighting terrorism is a shared base, which all of the recent
actors in the conflict–in spite of their differences– used to justify the legality of their actions. The
following sections analyze the Syrian case based on the major actors involved, which are the
Syrian regime, the international coalition, and Russia, followed by an analysis of the Security
Council‘s position regarding the Syrian Conflict. It begins with a brief overview of the conflict,
followed by analyzing the legal position of the major actors involved as well as the role played
by the Security Council in the conflict.
A. Background and Conflict Classification
At the outset, it is important to begin with a brief overview of the Syrian conflict. The Syrian
revolution started like that in Arab Spring states with pro-democracy demonstrations in March
2011. Eventually, protesters heightened their demands by calling for President Assad's
resignation following violent treatment by the police forces.349 The opposition started to take up
arms either in order to defend itself, or to expel regime forces from their local area.350 The ethnic
divisions later pushed the Syrian conflict beyond a ―battle‖ between supporters and opponents of
President Al Assad, into a civil war fueled by different regional and international agendas.351 The
emergence of jihadist groups such as El Nusra Front (Jabhat El Nusra) and ISIL has complicated
the scene. In 2014, the US-led coalition began strikes in Syria, targeting terrorist groups. In 2015,
Russia also began airstrikes in Syria on invitation from the Syrian regime. France joined the USled coalition in Syria by the end of 2015 after the Paris attacks.352
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Qualifying the conflict in Syria depends on the level of external state involvement in the
conflict.353 First, I will briefly tackle the classification of the conflict in Syria without outlining
the applicable laws to decide whether the negative equality doctrine is applicable. Before the
emergence of ISIL in Syria, the conflict between the Syrian regime and the opposition –noting its
scale and intensity - was clearly a civil war.354 The dilemma emerged after the intervention of
ISIL; whose extensive control in the Syrian territory creates an international dimension to the
conflict.355 Furthermore, both opposition groups and the regime receive either political or
material support from other states.356 As a result, this qualifies the conflict initially as
international armed conflict(IAC).To illustrate, the Syrian regime has been sustained mainly
from weapons from Russia and forces deployed by Iran through Hezbollah.357 On the other hand,
other states have sustained the opposition through providing army supplies or trainings.358 For
example, the US has offered training to ―moderate‖ rebels. Moreover, after September2014,
when the US-led coalition extended its operations to Syria the conflict turned into an
international armed conflict (IAC).359 Therefore, the fight between the Syrian regime and the
rebels is still a civil war, while the fight against ISIL is an international war, especially after the
intervention of the US led coalition.360 In short, Syria witnesses two types of conflicts:
international and non-international, depending on the involved actors. In other words, ―[w]hat
started as a popular uprising against the Syrian government four years ago has become a protoworld war with nearly a dozen countries embroiled in two overlapping conflicts.‖361 In the
following sections, I will analyze the legal justifications invoked by different actors involved in
the conflict; the Syrian regime, the US-led coalition, Russia,362 and the Security Council
respectively.
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B. The Syrian Regime
During the sessions of the Security Council in 2002 (in the aftermath of 9/11), when Syria was a
non-permanent member of the Council363 it was in favor of adopting an international definition
of terrorism. It argued that lacking a definition could allow for human rights violations and
―selective accusations of terrorism‖.364 Syria was determined to keep itself away from the
―enemy listing‖ through cooperating with the US against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
terrorist organizations in the global War on Terror that became likely polarized with an ―either
you are with us or you are the enemies‖ mentality.365 This became especially true after the
invasion of Iraq and the emergence of the Bush doctrine.366
Syria followed a criminal justice model by recognizing terrorism as a separate crime under the
Syrian Penal Code.367 Although the definition of terrorism under the Syrian penal code meets the
criteria of SC Res 1373,368 according to the CTC report,369 it imposes ―severe penalties for all
acts relating to terrorism.‖370 This was short lived however. After the eruption of the Syrian
revolution and especially after June 2012 when President Assad acknowledged Syria‘s state of
war,371 Syria witnessed changes to its anti-terrorism polices, and moved towards a military
model. This shift was officially declared by the Syrian government in the 2014 UNSC Verbatim
Record: ―[w]e are combating the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant… as well as other terrorist groups‖.372 (emphasis added)
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However, the Syrian regime manipulated the War on Terror by expanding the status of ‗other
terrorist groups‘ to include all the opposition groups.373 The vague language of the War on Terror
that Syria has rejected since 9/11 attacks is now being appropriated by the Syrian regime to suit
its interests. It includes violent repression of the opposition, irrespective of its affiliation to
terrorist groups. This affects civilians and causes collateral damage.
Revisiting the problem of defining who a terrorist is re-raises the question of how to qualify the
rebel groups fighting in Syria. Are they all terrorists? Or only some of them? If yes, who are the
terrorist then? Who decides?
The armed opposition in Syria is composed of more than 1,000 armed groups, commanding more
than 100,000 fighters.374 These groups vary in their size and scale of operations.375 The major
ones include the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic Front, Syrian
Islamic Liberation Front, Al Nusra Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL).376According to the Syrian regime, all rebels fighting on ground in Syria can be
assimilated to ISIL and other ‗undefined‘ terrorist groups.377 This leaves discretion to the state to
carve its own secret list of terrorists with no censorship over this authority.
On the other hand, the United Nations and the U.S consider both ISIL and El Nusra Front as
terrorist groups,378 whereas they consider the other groups such as the Syrian Opposition
Coalition to be the legitimate opposition to the Syrian regime.379
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C. The US‟s Involvement in Syria
The US involvement in Syria can be seen from two dimensions; an indirect involvement through
arming the moderate rebels as well as a direct one through the US-led Coalition.
1. Indirect Involvement Through Arming the „Moderate Rebels‟
The lack of a definition for who the terrorists are in Syria raises another problem related to the
US arming of ‗moderate rebels‘. In September 2014, the US Congress approved the training and
arming of about 5, 000 ‗moderate Syrian rebels‘ to fight ISIL380 and to promote ―the conditions
for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.‖381 However, the US has not given many
details about who the ‗moderate‘ Syrian opposition‘s members are. The criteria adopted to
distinguish between ‗moderates‘ and ‗extremists‘ or the types of the weaponry they receive, and
through which channels, and what the guarantees are for monitoring the disposition of
equipment.382 According to the US National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan
the US does not plan to give much information about the process of the rebels armament:―[t]he
United States is committed to building the capacity of the moderate opposition….we are not
going to detail every single type of our assistance.‖383 In October 2015, the U.S conducted a
strategic change in the program by supplying the leaders of existing forces with weapons and
military supplies instead of equipping and training ―new Syrian rebels‖.384
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This shift came as a result of the failure of the old strategy that resulted in the takeover of the
U.S weaponry supplied to the trained groups by Jabhat El Nusra and other terrorist groups.385
This lead to further expectation of the failure of this new strategy by Lindsey Graham- the GOP
presidential candidate, when he noted that, "[n]o one in Syria is going to just fight ISIL, they
want to take Assad on, who has massacred their family, so it was doomed to fail with these
restrictions.‖386 The question arises as to, who bears the responsibility for this failure in the US‘s
strategy.
The legality of arming the moderate rebels is related to the US involvement in Syria. There is
very little literature on this topic. However, a potential argument could be that the US arming
those rebels falls under the ‗necessary measures‘ for fighting ISIL justified by the inability of the
Syrian regime to combat them. This argument is supported by the unwilling or unable standard.
Another argument is because Syria has been designated by the US as ―a safe heaven‖ for terrorist
groups, the US armament of the rebels does not violate the sovereignty of Syria.
In contrast, another valid argument is that the US arming of the rebels violates international law
due its violation of the prohibition of the use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs
of other sovereign states ( the Nicaragua test),387 by violating the sovereignty of Syrian territory.
However, in order to establish US responsibility for the actions of the rebels, it must be proved
that the US has exercised effective control over them as required by the ICJ in the Nicaragua
case.388
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2. Direct Involvement Through the US-led Coalition389
This section tackles the possible justifications for the US direct involvement in Syria started that
started September 2014.390 These potential justifications can be the use of force in Syria that are:
collective self-defense on behalf of Iraq, the extraterritorial use of force against terrorists,
humanitarian intervention, and the inability and unwillingness of the Syrian government to act
against terrorists.
(i) Collective Self-Defense on Behalf of Iraq
After ISIL attacked Iraq, the Iraqi government requested the assistance of the US to fight against
this terrorist group.391 The US, as well as other states such as United Arab Emirates, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan expressed its willingness to assist Iraq through establishing a coalition
to fight ISIL in Iraq. It was justified as collective self-defense on behalf of the Iraqi
government.392However, the US-led coalition has extended its airstrikes to Syria when ISIL has
conducted some operations from within Syrian territory. This involvement includes targeting
ISIL through the US-led coalition and targeting the Khorasan terrorist group.393 According to
Marc Weller if the Iraqi government has the right to self-defense against ISIL operating in Syria,
the government also ―has the legal right to ask its allies for collective self-defense to support
it‖.394 This can be true if the UN Security Council explicitly authorized the use of force under a
collective self-defense measure similarly to what it did during Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait.
However, this is not the case here, as the legality of the extraterritorial use of force against NonState Actors under self-defense is still a debatable issue.395
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According to this understanding, the US-led coalition‘s airstrikes are lawful as long as they are
confined to Iraq and not extended to Syria. According to the US, more than forty states have
provided assistance in the fight against ISIL both in Iraq and Syria.396 However, this participation
varies from the use of force by states such as the United Kingdom and France which, at the
outset of the coalition‘s operations in 2014 was confined to Iraq, and then later extended to
Syria,397 to other states such as Jordan, UAE, and KSA which extended the use of force to Syria
since launching first airstrikes against ISIL.398
Although France was the first to join the US-led coalition in Iraq as well as to ―provid[e]
logistical support to the anti-Assad Syrian rebels it considers moderate‖, it had not extended its
airstrikes to Syria, favoring pushing for diplomatic endeavors, until the occurrence of Paris
attacks in November 2015.399 The French president's office stated that:"[w]e will strike whenever
our national security is at stake."400 It emphasized that airstrikes were justified on the ground of
on ―intelligence gathered from air surveillance operations conducted over Syria during the past
two weeks‖.401 These statements reflect the fact that France justifies its participation in the USled airstrikes in Syria based on the right to self-defense. Moreover, the French Prime Minister
Manuel Valls referred to the humanitarian intervention‘ justification as a subordinate reason for
targeting ISIL in Syria. He noted that the airstrikes comes in response to the refugee crisis that
includes thousands of civilians who have been derivn out of Syria: "[w]e're not going to receive
4 to 5 million Syrians, so the problem has to be dealt with at the source".402 The significance of
this change in France‘s strategy comes in response to a crisis that is less in intensity and scale
than other terrorist incidents; this crisis introduced the extension as inevitable and legitimate
(self-defense).
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This extension has been met with no condemnation from states, as it is a result of accumulated
changes in the legal framework for combating terrorism discussed in previous chapters that
facilitates normalizing such action as well as fostering these changes.
(ii) Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorists
The extraterritorial use of force against terrorists by the US without the consent of the territorial
state and not condemned started earlier than the Syrian case.403 For example, the extraterritorial
operation in Yemen in 2002 targeting al Qaida elements was not met with condemnation.404
When the US-led coalition started its operations in Syria, it revived the scholarly debate about
the legality of using force against non- state actors in other states.405
When the operations in Syria began, this area of law was still unsettled and ‗fairly open‘ to
interpretation.406 For this reason, states ―could plausibly invoke or apply any of these positions in
the Syrian case.‖407Some states, such as China and India, tolerated the operation despite their
previous condemnation of similar operations based on their appreciation of the international fight
against terrorism supported by the international community. This is to say, ―[m]ost States
tolerate operations that they are not yet willing to validate with legal language.‖408
In contrast, other states such as Russia and Iran condemned the operations based on the
‗absolute‘ prohibition of using force against non-state actors.409 Some states went further, with
the Argentinean President Cristina Fernandez de Kirschner noting that the ineffectiveness of the
UN‘s response allows military interventions: ―if the UN General Assembly is actually allowed to
serve its mandate, despite the lack of observance by some nations,…we could actually have
international law and order built on dialogue and peace instead of military intervention.‖410
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Furthermore, the UN Special Envoy for Syria stated that the U.S.-led coalition‘s operations in
Syria are based on SC Res 2170.411 According to the language of SC Res 2170, member states
were to ―suppress the flow of foreign fighters, financing and other support to Islamist extremist
groups in Iraq and Syria…‖ However, it did not explicitly authorize the use of force.
The airstrikes targeting the Khorasan groups were justified based on anticipatory self-defense.
According to a Pentagon official, the airstrikes ―were undertaken to disrupt imminent attack
plotting against the United States and western targets‖.412 He emphasized that according to the
intelligence reports, the group ―was in the final stages of plans to execute major attacks.‖413 For
this reason, the US launched its airstrikes targeting the Khorasan groups.
The anticipatory self-defense argument, as based on the Caroline incident, can only be lawful
when an attack is imminent.414 This imminence is understood as ―instant and overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."415 In addition, most mainstream
scholars argue that a state cannot rely on the right to self-defense against non-state actors in
another state unless there is proof of the exercising of ‗effective control‘ by the host state over
those non- state actors.416
However, many scholars argue that these rules on attribution were relaxed after 9/11, as was
discussed in chapter two.417 However, since the U.S has described Syria as a ‗safe heaven‘ for
terrorists, it tends to use a new standard which is ‗harboring terrorism‘ to legalize its operations
over the Syrian territory. The US has asserted that ―[i]n the fight against ISIL, [it] cannot rely on
an Assad [sic] regime that terrorizes its own people‖.418
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(iii) Humanitarian Intervention
Another argument could be humanitarian intervention. It is argued that because of the Security
Council‘s failure to fulfill its role in Syria by taking action to save people from the oppression of
their governments due to the Security Council veto, states unilaterally replace the role that
should be played by the Security Council. This argument was used to justify the US led coalition
in Syria because of the repression and human tragedy perpetrated in Syria by the regime.419 This
raises the dilemma of favoring moral imperative over legality.420 This dilemma has been further
developed under a new form that is unwilling or unable standard. It was argued if the Syrian
regime is unable to suppress ISIL and protect its population, ―international action should be
undertaken on behalf of that population, rather than its abusive government.‖421 In addition, the
unwillingness of the Syrian regime to suppress terrorists is debated based on ―its passive
toleration of the establishment of ISIL on its territory for many months, failing in its
responsibility to protect.‖422
(iv) The Syrian Government is Unable and Unwilling to Act Against Terrorists
The US argues that the inability and the unwillingness of the Syrian regime to suppress terrorists
legitimize the US led coalition‘s intervention in Syria. According to the US report to the Security
Council, it argues that that self-defense is triggered where the ―government of the state where the
threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks‖.423 This
standard can be viewed as an indirect link between states and the acts of non-State actors in order
to establish attribution ignoring the ―effective control‖ standard as a pre-requisite for State
involvement.424
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In order to analyze Syria‘s position, it can be argued that the Syrian case is more compatible with
this perception that assumes a lower standard of attribution to the state. According to the US
arguments, Syria has lost control of many parts of the country and is unable to suppress
terrorists. For this reason, it has been contested that it should be up to the victim state (Iraq) to
decide on the level of unwillingness or the inability of the state from which the attacks are
launched (Syria).425 However, this also leaves the potential for the victim state to manipulate this
discursive authority based on its own interests. Another point of view argues that the Security
Council should be the entity that decides whether a state is suppressing terrorists in its territory
or tolerating their existence in order to avoid manipulation.426 For example, the origin of this
standard stems from the Rome Statute of the ICC, where it is the court which determines whether
sates are unwilling or unable to prosecute or conduct the necessary investigations.427
The inability of the Syrian regime to suppress terrorism was stated outright in the U.S letter to
the UNSC, ―[the] Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront these safe havens
effectively itself.‖428 Using the term ‗safe heaven‘ implies the inability of the government to
suppress terrorists.
In addition, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in his speech concerning the US-led
coalition‘s airstrikes in Syria stated that: ―….[the]strikes took place in areas no longer under the
effective control of [the Syrian] Government.‖429 These words suggest implicit acceptance of the
US-led coalition‘s operations justified by the inability of the Syrian regime to suppress terrorists.
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Moreover, SC Res 2170 refers explicitly to the territories controlled by ISIL in Syria, which also
suggest that Syria is no longer the governing authority in the region.430 Although the US led
coalition strikes in Syria suggest that the unwilling and unable standard is ―starting to seem less
controversial and better settled as doctrine,‖431 according to the ICJ judgment in the Nicaragua
case, there is a difference between ―statements of international policy‘ and ‗an assertion of rules
of existing customary international law‖.432 Thus, it seems plausible that it still probably too
early to consider it as a rule of customary international law, especially since these latest
operations are still ―unlikely to be legitimized or validated as lawful, but they also are unlikely to
be condemned or treated as unlawful‖.433
D. Russian Intervention
As mentioned in section A above, there are two simultaneous armed conflicts in Syria, a noninternational armed conflict between the Syrian regime while the fight against ISIL is an
international armed conflict. The question arises then where the Russian intervention in Syria
fits. Is it lawful for the Syrian regime to seek foreign assistance? Has it the capacity (valid
consent) to seek assistance?
1. Syria Seeking Support (Negative Equality Doctrine)
According to the negative equality doctrine,434 in the case of civil wars neither the government
nor the rebels can seek foreign assistance in order to avoid military intervention by outside
powers in civil wars.435 However, it has been argued that recent state practice suggests that this
principle is no longer applicable, especially in the context of the War on Terror.436
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In September 2015, Russia launched its first airstrikes over Syrian territory upon request of the
Syrian regime for assistance to fight terrorist groups. Moscow declared that it is targeting "all
terrorists" in the Syrian territory including ISIL.437 This issue is controversial. One argument
confirms the compatibility of the Russian action with international law. It claims that there is no
rule prohibiting intervention with invitation from the government if the consent is valid.438
However, Russian intervention has been criticized by the West,439 because it supports the Syrian
regime. Here two important points arise; first, most of the criticism directed towards Russia is
based on extending the Russian operations to include other opposition elements besides ISIL.440
Generally, it was not the legality of intervention by invitation by the Syrian regime that was
debated, but rather the scope of this intervention.441
The second issue is the conflict between the international acceptance of the request of the US-led
coalition by the Iraqi government to fight ISIL, while critiquing the same avenue by Russia,
considering the fact that both states are highly affected by ISIL‘s activities over their
territories.442 However, Marc Weller argues that the Iraqi and Syrian cases are not perfectly
similar for comparison.443 To illustrate, the Iraqi government is ‗duly‘ elected, so it is the
legitimate government that has the capacity to seek assistance fighting threats imposed by
ISIL.444 On the contrary, the Syrian president‘s legitimacy is debated because of his massacres
towards his population as well as the fact that the elections were only held in areas dominated by
the regime.445 However, it is possible that the UN is the only authoritative entity to decide on the
legitimacy of the regime and because it has made no statement declaring that the Syrian regime
is no longer the representative of Syria‘s people, theoretically it cannot be assumed that the
Syrian regime is no longer legitimate.446

437

Syria, supra note 3543.
Russia‘s Intervention in Syria, EJIL: TALK!, http://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-intervention-in-syria/ (last visited Dec 8, 2015).
439
Joint declaration on recent military actions of the Russian Federation in Syria - Press releases - GOV.UK,
,https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-declaration-on-recent-military-actions-of-the-russian-federation-in-syria (last visited
Dec 8, 2015).
440
Supra note 394.
441
Ibid.
442
Marc Weller, supra note 356.
443
Supra note 394.
444
Ibid.
445
Marc Weller, supra note 356.
446
Ibid.
438

71

Although some states have recognized the Syrian National Coalition as the legitimate
representative of Syria‟s people, this ‗recognition‘ has not reached the level of a legal
recognition, but rather serves the purpose of political support.447 This leaves President Al Assad
as the internationally recognized representative of Syria. Another argument by Doswald-Beck,
Gray and Cortenis is that for this group military assistance is acceptable for fighting ISIL
because they are an international threat.448 To illustrate, ISIL resides in two different territories
Iraq and Syria where the groups exchange support, recruit fighters from different countries, and
seek to establish a caliphate even beyond these territories.449 Moreover, the Iraqi government has
referred to ISIL‘s ―safe haven‖ in Syria qualifying this as one of the determining factors
‗necessitating‘ its request for assistance.450 In this case, the fight against ISIL is no longer within
the scope of a civil war whereby a government cannot seek foreign assistance based on the
negative equality doctrine. For these reasons, seeking assistance is lawful.
Finally, Christakis and Bannerlier argue that in the case of civil wars it is lawful for the
government to seek foreign assistance if jointly fighting terrorism. The problem with this opinion
is that it revives the problem of defining terrorists, especially if a government ‗portrays‘ the
opposition as terrorists ―in order to legitimize [the government] politically and be legally able to
request external help against [the opposition].‖451
2. Consent
Consent is one of the acts precluding wrongfulness under international law.452 The validity of
consent depends on being ―…actually expressed by the State rather than presumed on the basis
that the State would have consented, had it been asked.‖453 The importance of this validity has
been affirmed in DRC v. Uganda where the ICJ considered consent as a circumstance precluding
the wrongfulness, as long as it exists.454
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Syria, in reference to the US led coalition operations in Syria has declared that: ―[a]ny action of
any kind without the consent of the Syrian government would be an attack on Syria.‖455 It asserts
that it ―stands with any international effort aimed at fighting and combating terrorism‖ but
stresses that this must occur ―within the frame of full respect of national sovereignty, and in
conformity with international conventions.‖456 Therefore, the fight against terrorism in Syria
should be with the consent of Syria in order to be compatible with the rules of international law.
Since Syria did not consent to the US-led coalition operations, the operation lacks legal
justification unless customary international law of the unable or unwilling standard has been
settled. On the contrary, Russia‘s intervention by invitation is lawful.457
Moreover, it is not sufficient to have explicit consent, it is also important that the government has
the capacity to consent by exercising effective control over the territory. Although the Syrian
regime has lost effective control over vast areas of Syria, state practice has accepted invitations
by other states in a similar position. For example, the Iraqi government lost effective control over
vast areas of its territory that were mainly gained by ISIL.458 In addition, there are some cases,
such as Libya and Somalia where this factor was totally disregarded and replaced with the
‗internationally recognized governments‘.459
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E. The Security Council
The Security Council has played a passive role in the Syrian conflict. In2012 the veto by China
and the Russian Federation on the authorization of measures under article 42 against Syria left
the Security Council paralyzed, as it lacked the required majority for issuing binding resolutions
under Chapter VII of the Charter.460 Since then, the role played by the Security Council has been
limited to condemnation of the grave human rights violations by the Syrian regime as seen in
resolutions 2118 of 2013 and 2165 of 2014.461 While concerning the fight against terrorism, it
only considers ISIL and Al-Nusra Front as threats to international peace and security in Res 2170
of 2014, which allows taking measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.
The most recent resolution by the SC Res 2249 of 2015, adopted unanimously after the terrorist
attacks in Paris on 13th November 2015 following a proposal from France is significant in the
context of the Syrian conflict.462 It calls upon ―Member States that have the capacity to do so to
take all necessary measures‖ to ―prevent‖ and ―suppress‖ ISIL.463 Although the preamble of the
resolution did not explicitly authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this
language reflects that the resolution legitimizes the measures ‗taken‘ as well as ‗to be taken‘
against ISIL under the explicit endorsement of the Council.464 Although the preamble of the
resolution refers to ISIL as ―a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and
security‖ that triggers the application of article 39 of the Charter, the resolution was not adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.465
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In order for the resolution to have a binding nature, it must ―decide to do something or to
authorize something‖.466 This is not the first Security Council Resolution to refer to the right of
states to the use of force without authorizing this use, and could trigger flexible interpretation of
the resolution to legitimize the use of force.467 For example, although SC Res 1373 did not
authorize the use of force, and referred to the ‗inherent‘ right to self-defense, it was the claimed
justification behind the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001.468 Although the language of the
resolution suggests that the Council ‗contemplates‘ or ‗welcomes‘ the use of force against ISIL,
it does not explicitly legalize such use through stating that the ―necessary measures‖ should be
―in compliance with international law, in particular the United Nations Charter‖.469 Therefore,
the resolution does not create a new legal basis for military operations in Syria against ISIL.470
However, states have started to take advantage of the resolution. For example, in a statement by
Syria‘s U.N. Ambassador Bashar Ja‘afari, he noted that:―[w]elcome to everybody who finally
woke up and joined the club of combating terrorists,‖471this reflects an opportunistic conclusion
by Syria in an attempt to legalize its actions against ISIL or whoever the regime decides to be
alike ISIL.
In addition, the US-led coalition will also take advantage of the resolution claiming that it
‗implicitly validates‘ their operations in Syria.472 Furthermore, other states such the UK has used
the resolution to gain political support for joining the Coalition‘s operations in Syria.473 Despite
this, the language of the resolution can still be read in conjunction with the rules of international
law that require Syrian consent to use force, which fits with both the Russian and the Syrian
arguments.474
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This is, ―the resolution‘s constructive ambiguity: it allows the major players in Syria to
politically move closer together without departing from the legal positions that they had
previously adopted, and without compromising their essential interests.‖475 In short, the language
of the resolution has been appropriated by the different actors involved in the Syrian conflict in
order to legalize its actions.
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VI. Conclusion
International law is a field that is obsessed with crises, especially when security is at stake. The
legal framework for combating terrorism has evolved since 9/11. The major turning points
analyzed in this paper are the 9/11 attacks and the Arab Spring. These two incidents led to
twofold developments: it started with expanding the exceptions to the existing legal framework
on the use of force to adapt to the new threats to peace and security after 9/11. This incident may
have lent legitimacy to new forms of the right to self-defense such as preemptive and
anticipatory self-defense with less restrictive requirements them in the context of the ―War on
Terror‖. Then, it introduced new rules that deviate from the system created by the UN Charter
through consistent states practice such as unilateral actions to fight terrorists in another state, and
the ‗unwilling and unable‘ standard that

recognizes lower standard of attribution of state

responsibility.
The Arab Spring has not only maintained the changes introduced after 9/11, but also suggests
that crises effects‘, when it comes to terrorism, are becoming less disputed, more lenient, and
easily normalized within the context of the War On Terror. Syria as a case study is a clear
example of this effect. The major actors involved in the conflict, which are the Syrian regime,
the US led coalition, Russia have ―appropriated‖ the War on Terror implying the changes in the
legal framework on the use of force after 9/11 as newly recognized legal basis. A recent example
is the Paris attacks in 2015, which despite being less in intensity and scale than other several
terrorist attacks,476 were the reason behind changing France strategy through extending is
airstrikes in Syria with no condemnation from the international community. I can see it as a
linear change, which started with huge resistance to changes after 9/11, then followed with less
resistance and condemnation, and finally toleration and normalization of these changes during
Arab Spring. That is why tracing these changes is significant. In spite of these dramatic changes,
I believe that this area of international law is still unsettled and requires further investigation
before acknowledging these changes as customary international law that binds all states.
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Moreover, the collective security system created by the UN has risen right after 9/11 through
expanding the Security Council functions to include quasi legislative and administrative
functions. However, by the time, this system is diminishing where the unilateral actions in the
fight against terrorism are prevailing and Syria is a prototype example. The Security Council was
paralyzed to the authorize measures under article 42 against Syria by the Chinese and the
Russian‘s veto. However, the US led coalition launched its airstrikes without the authorization of
the Security Council on the ground of different legal justifications such as collective self-defense
on behalf of Iraq and the inability and unwillingness of the Syrian government to act against
terrorists. Thus, the Security Council should revive its role as protector of peace and security
though collective security measures and limits the use of force under any circumstances to its
authorization based on its binding resolutions. Achieving this goal requires more representative
membership of the Council to include more states and new decision making mechanism to limit
manipulation by superpowers. This will create a robust stance against terrorism and deliver the
right message to the international community that the Security Council is capable of maintaining
peace and security.477
Finally, the criminal justice model as the core system for fighting terrorism before 9/11 is now
on a decline in states‘ tools for fighting terrorism in favor of the military mode operation. This
mode followed by states is exacerbating the vicious cycle of terrorism. This is to say, ―[i]f we
respond by bombing every Islamic State target we can find, odds are high we‘ll end up bombing
some people we never wanted or intended to bomb,478 and this won‘t help us make new
friends.‖479 Simply, force and violence will replace punishment and assassinations will replace
executions, which ultimately turn terrorism into ―a construct located both inside and outside
law.‖480
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Thus, the first robust step towards combating terrorism is to consider it as an ongoing process
that requires management not an ―aberrational‖ phenomenon.481 This understanding paves
stopping ―overreacting‖ to it.482
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